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1. SUMMARY 
The last few years have not exactly be a walk in the park for airlines worldwide as several dramatic 
events occurred, inter alia, the Germanwings crash in the French Alps. These tragic events have an 
influence on passengers' behaviours and the way they perceive the industry. Consequently, airlines 
must be prepared to face such crisis, but also competition, and the recent appearance of low-cost 
carriers has changed the rules of the game. This thesis has therefore the ambition to describe, analyse 
and comment the way airlines compete within the internal market. This thesis will focus on three 
aspects of competition: the competitive strategy of a single airline, the way airlines cooperate 
between each other, and to finish the circumstances under which Member States are allowed to 
support airlines through state aid mechanisms.   
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2. PREFACE 
This thesis marks a full stop to my studies at Lund University and in general. I enjoyed being part of 
the European Business Law program, and I hope this thesis depicts the skills I have acquired and 
expanded during these two years. I am now looking forward new experiences in the real world to 
deploy my skills.  
I am grateful for the support and the advices of Professor Jörgen Hettne which helped me during the 
writing of my thesis. 
 
Lund, May 2015 
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3. ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
ASA: Air Service Agreement 
CC: Charter Carrier 
EU: European Union 
FSC: Full Service Carrier 
IATA: International Air Transport Association 
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization 
JV: Joint-venture 
LCC: Low Cost Carrier 
SGEI: Service of General Economic Interest 
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
Block-space agreement: an agreement under which a carrier (the marketing carrier) will reserve a 
certain amount of seats in a flight operated by another carrier (the operating carrier). 
 
Code-share agreement: an agreement allowing a carrier (the marketing carrier) to market the flight of 
another carrier (the operating carrier). 
 
Incremental costs: the extra costs associated with manufacturing one additional unit of production. 
 
Interlining agreement: an agreement under which a carrier accepts/recognizes the travel documents 
issued by another carrier to carry on the service. 
 
Predatory price: a price that is so low that competitors cannot compete and are driven from the 
market. 
 
Slot: a permission given to use the full range of airport infrastructure necessary to operate an air 
service at a coordinated airport on a specific date and time for the purpose of landing or take-off. 
 
Yield management: the application of information systems and pricing strategies to allocate the right 
capacity to the right customer at the right place at the right time. 
   
 
  
8 
 
 
 
 
4. INTRODUCTION 
4.1. Overview of the study 
Booking a flight and travelling around the world has become an affordable and accessible choice for 
many passengers-consumers, be it in a touristic, family or business context.  
In the recent years and following the entry into force of new regulations, the airline industry has been 
subjected to a fierce competition between companies having different business models. But it also 
had to cope with several internal and external crises such as the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US or the 
SARS1 epidemic in Asia, which have shaken its foundations and questioned its traditional structure2. 
The network planning of airlines was affected and the crises had a huge impact on the world 
economy3. 
One thing to understand is that the airline industry has unique features and its business assets consist 
on passenger transports, which are extremely perishable goods4. Therefore, one of the difficulties 
faced by airlines is to adapt themselves to the demand. But, when a crisis explodes somewhere in the 
world, it can be difficult to react and adjust quickly to limit losses.  
Those crises have an influence on the airlines strategies (old and new players alike) and they 
consequently have an impact on the structure of the market.  Therefore, the constraints imposed on 
the industry, which are partially linked to its object, its network and structure, may explain the way 
the industry has been regulated and gradually subjected to competition law in the EU. The present 
study will focus on the application of competition rules to airlines and the way these companies 
behave on the market, and more precisely enter it.  
4.2. Aim of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the entry of airlines in the market from different angles while 
taking into account both internal and external elements which may affect the competition climate of 
the industry (such as passengers, airports and public entities). 
When an airline decides to enter a new market, it must consider the following elements: to obtain 
access to the airports (slots), to organize the staff, to promote and advertise the route, to set launch 
                                                           
1 The SARS (i.e. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic happened in 2003 and caused 774 deaths.  
2 Rigas Doganis, The Airline Business (2nd Edition, Routledge, 2006) p. 1.  
3 See Brian Pearce, Avian Flu, IATA Economic Briefing, May 2006. 
4 Alessandro Cento, The Airline Industry: Challenges in the 21st Century (Contributions to Economics) (Physica-
Verlag Heidelberg, 2009) p. 47. 
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price, to organize the logistic (aircraft and so on) etc. If the airline was already operating, there is 
adjustment costs linked to the modification of the network structure and the redeployment of the 
fleet for example. Additionally, if in the end the route does not yield benefits, limiting the frequency 
of the flights or closing the route will generate fruitless expenditure5.  
Different issues appear here such as the access to airports, which are infrastructures having a limited 
capacity, or the way airlines use the infrastructure as part of their business strategy. This lead us to 
the type of relationship airlines develop between each other and how they compete against each 
other. To finish, the last issue is related to the deterrent effect the costs of opening a new route may 
have and it questions how far can a Member State go to help the creation of new routes through the 
state aid mechanism.   
To conclude,  the choice of this topic is justified by the structure of this particular industry, structure 
that permits some undesirable deviations from the competition rules by reason of its characteristics. 
But the airline industry is also interesting because of the nature of the service provided and the 
importance allocated to external elements. Its political implications and the impact it can have on the 
EU economy should also be recalled.  
This topic is also recent from a competition law's perspective and will give us a clear comprehension 
of the competition rules' mechanisms while giving us a sharp understanding of the latest stances of 
the EU institutions as to competition law. To finish, this industry is quite unique and despite the 
liberalization process remains a highly regulated sector6.  
Therefore, this thesis will aim at answering the following questions: How difficult it is for airlines to 
enter the market? Is the current state of law sufficient to maintain effective competition in the airline 
industry? If not, what kind of improvements could be provided to the actual system? 
4.3. Research and approach 
To answer these questions, the thesis will follow the legal dogmatic method which consists in 
researching the current state of law, but also case law and doctrines, in order to draw a clear picture 
of the situation. The latest developments in the industry and in the law will be included.  Based on 
these researches, the thesis will then attempt to describe, analyse and criticize the situation to finally 
propose possible improvements.    
                                                           
5 Cento (4), p. 48.  
6 James Peoples, "The Economics of International Airline Transport" in Advances in Airline Economics, Volume 4 
(1st Edition, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2014) Chapter 2 p. 36. 
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The legal dogmatic method is well-adapted to the airline industry because, as previously stated, this 
industry is sensible to external elements and geopolitics. Regulating airlines is not only a matter of 
law. For this reason, a clear understanding of the liberalization process which started in the 1980's in 
Europe is important. It will help the reader to see the huge improvements made in the recent years 
but also the limit of the existing legal framework. Additionally, it is difficult to separate the EU airline 
industry from the worldwide market. Therefore, an explanation of how Air Service Agreements are 
concluded and what kind of provisions they may contain is inevitable.  To finish, the identification of 
barriers to entry is only possible where a clear picture of the regulatory framework is drawn. It will 
allow us to identify where improvements should be made. These elements will be presented through 
the historical background (Part 5.).    
Then, the thesis  will analyse and criticize the different competition rules applied to airline, by making 
a distinction between the rules applied to a single airline, and the rules apply to airlines when they 
interact with other undertakings or entities. This approach will give a clear view on the margin of 
action airlines have and how difficult it can be to enter the market. 
4.4. Limits of the thesis 
This thesis will focus mainly on the EU civil airline industry (even though some comparison will be 
made with the US system where relevant) and more precisely on the passenger transport. Moreover, 
the thesis has only for ambition to cover competition issues, other elements of law will be ignored.  
The thesis will in a first phase give an overview of the historical development of the airline industry 
(Part 5), then focus in a second phase on an explanation of the application of competition rules to 
airlines (Part 6 ), and in a third phase the thesis will consist on a detailed analysis of the barriers to 
entry identified previously (Part 7). 
 
5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
To deepen our comprehension of this peculiar industry, it is necessary to begin with a complete 
analysis of its regulatory framework7, and that from its origin. Interestingly, airlines have been 
nationally regulated for many years even though running an airline involves working in an 
international context. This is what Rigas Doganis called a paradox: on one hand airlines were nationally 
                                                           
7 Doganis (2), p. 27. 
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controlled and owned when, on the other hand, they are meant to operate at an international level8. 
But the airline industry has been and remains an extremely dynamic industry which has known several 
developments. These developments are technical, but not only. There are also legal, institutional and 
cultural9.  
5.1. The situation prior liberalization: a state-owned industry 
The structure of the industry has drastically evolved. In the tradition, airlines were state-owned and 
had their own market. Competition rules were not applicable. But the situation has changed, the 
deregulation process in the US, followed by the EU liberalization, have introduced a dynamic and free 
market industry10. It was answering a need for more economic efficiency and competition, and state 
ownership is known to be problematic where it prevents companies from operating profitably11.  
Also, the Commission drawn up an interesting report of the situation in Europe before the 
liberalization took place in 198412. Its Memorandum highlighted the specific relationship existing 
between the Member States and their national airlines, which were not always following sound 
commercial management principles13. Indeed, airlines were not under commercial pressure, and 
therefore did not have to control their operations and costs14. Also, the Member States were not 
willing to apply competition rules to them and they only agreed on bringing some evolutionary 
changes to the system15. To summarise, there was a sort of symbiosis16 between airlines and Member 
States. From another side, the Commission campaigned for more flexibility and competition17 and to 
establish a better control towards state aid18. 
If we come back to the origin of the airline industry, one particularity has to be emphasized to 
understand the industry future transformation. In Europe, almost all the countries had their own 
national airlines, also known as "flag carriers", in which they had a certain pride. They were usually 
stated-owned and in a dominant position on the national market, if not monopolistic. It had the effect 
                                                           
8 Doganis (2), p. 27. 
9 Cento (4), p.13.  
10 Cento (4), p.13. 
11 Doganis (2), p.3. 
12 European Commission, Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2 - Progress Towards the Development of a 
Community Air Transport Policy, COM(84) 72 final (Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2). 
13 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, para. 42.i. 
14 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Para. 42.iii. 
15 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Para. 10.  
16 Magnus Schmauch, EU Law on State Aid to Airlines (Law, Economics and Policy) (Lexxion Publisher - Berlin, 
2012) p.37. 
17 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Para. 39. 
18 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2, Para.s 61 and al. 
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to restrict competition and to fragment the European market. The main competitors of flag carriers 
were in fact other transportation modes at a national level. 
The first important convention on air transport that will be addressed here is the Chicago Convention 
from 194419 which attempted to introduce some competition concerns within the civil air industry by 
regulating some of its features20. This Convention organized technical and legal aspects of 
international air transport such as safety standard. And it established the International Aviation 
Organization ("ICAO") in charge of technical and operational standards21.  Also, Article 1 of the Chicago 
Convention recalled22 that "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace 
above its territory". But it failed to organize economic provisions related to cross border issues such 
as traffic rights, which were instead bilaterally regulated between countries under what we call Air 
Service Agreements ("ASA")23. These agreements were, and remain, a barrier to competition as they 
restrict market access but also create an extremely fragmented international market for airlines. And, 
to conclude, even though the Chicago Convention constitutes the basis of air law it has not been very 
successful, the lack of economic dispositions being problematic.  
5.2. The introduction of economic concerns  
To face up with this situation, three pillars of regulations were introduced and remained relevant until 
the early 1980's: the ASA's, the inter-airline commercial or pooling agreements and the tariff-fixing 
system set by the International Air Transport Association ("IATA")24.  
Regarding the first pillar, ASA are trade agreements concluded between two countries' governments. 
They can organize, among other, traffic rights, routes, airlines designations, capacities and 
frequencies25. Usually, the provisions are divided between so-called soft rights and hard rights. Soft 
rights organize operational details of the air transport where hard rights concern economic 
elements26. Therefore, ASA can, depending on the way they are drafted, efficiently limit access and 
market entry. 
                                                           
19 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at 
Chicago, on 7 December 1944, ICAO Doc 7300. 
20 Doganis (2), p.27. 
21 Cento (4), p.14. 
22 It has its origin within Article 1 of the Paris Convention (Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial 
Navigation, signed at Paris, on 13 October 1919). 
23 Schmauch (16), p.18. 
24 Doganis (2), p. 27-28. 
25 Doganis (2), p. 28 and Peoples (6), Chapter 2 p. 13-14. 
26 Doganis (2), p.28. 
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The traffic rights, referred to earlier, are also known as "the air freedoms" (See Annex I). They consist 
in privilege to enter and land in another country. They aim to standardize and simplify the air 
transport. Nine freedoms can be listed but not all of them are agreed upon in equal terms. For 
example, the Eighth and Ninth Freedoms related to cabotage rights are prohibited in the US27. 
Cabotage rights allow an airline to carry passenger from one point to another within a foreign country. 
An hypothetical example would be Norwegian air shuttle28 carrying a flight from Paris to Toulouse in 
France. 
Therefore, it is important to understand that ASA vary from one to another, some are stricter than 
other, and they consist on a mix of economic and administrative provisions taken with political 
considerations.  
In addition, an ASA can contain a nationality or ownership clause which requires airlines to be 
"substantially owned or effectively controlled"29 by nationals of the country to which traffic rights have 
been granted. This type of provisions has the effect of preventing cross-border concentration and 
justifies the appearance of alliances, interesting tools used by airlines which will be analysed further 
within this thesis30. Following a defined strategy, airlines agree to join or create an alliance for several 
reasons, but the main idea behind remains the access to the connection system of the partners31 and 
to obtain "the benefits of large size and scope"32.  
Before the liberalization process in the EU, ASA were even negotiated on a bilateral basis between 
Member States and Third Parties. Around 60 to 70 agreements were concluded by each Member 
State33! But, fortunately, the situation has changed. From a bilateral approach, we moved toward a 
community approach of air transport, and the nationality or ownership clause was exchanged for the 
notion of community ownership rights34. To put it simply, ASA disappeared from the EU scenery. This 
was a positive step toward efficient competition within the European market, and it opened the door 
for a possible and necessary restructuration of the industry. It should be added that nowadays, in 
                                                           
27 See 19 CFR 122.165 on air cabotage, and 49 U.S.C 41703 on navigation of foreign civil aircraft. 
28 Norwegian company whose headoffice is in Forneby, Norway. 
29 Doganis (2), p.28. 
30 Doganis (2), p.2. 
31 Cento (4), p.38. 
32 Doganis (2), p.2. 
33 Schmauch (16), p.27. 
34 Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (DLR), Topical Report on Airline Business Models, 2008, 
pp.28-29 (DLR Report) 
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relation with third countries and taking account of Article 100 TFEU, the Commission is the one in 
charge of negotiating ASA on behalf of the EU Member States35. 
As to the second pillar, pooling agreements can be briefly described as a revenue sharing mechanism 
between airlines36 but no further explanation is necessary here.  
Concerning the third pillar, IATA is an International organization composed of airline companies, which 
has been established in 1945 in Havana. The main purpose behind its creation was to protect the 
interests of airlines and to counterweight ICAO37 (the inter-governmental agency), which is a "public" 
organization and does not represent the private interests of airlines.   
IATA established a tariff setting system. The tariffs were commonly used by governments38, and 
included in bilateral ASA even though price fixing was already labelled as anti-competitive39. Indeed, 
it  was prohibited under anti-trust law40 in the US, and, later on, under competition law41 in Europe.  
This depicts rather well how distinctive was the air transport industry at that time. Nonetheless, 
nowadays, the tariff setting has disappeared and airlines are usually free to set their own prices42.  
In any event, the bilaterism (i.e. the recourse to ASA) which is characteristic of this period discouraged 
innovation and competition43. But in the 1970s, the IATA tariff and conditions of service started to be 
questioned in the US and a movement influenced by the public, the press and consumers questioned 
the old pricing system. This lead us gradually to deregulation and liberalization44. The US opened the 
way for a more competitive airline industry.  
5.3. The US deregulation's wave  
In the US, the deregulation started in 1978 with the Airline Deregulation Act45 which entirely revised 
the access to routes. At the beginning, it had the effect of increasing the number of merger between 
airlines. The goal pursued was to create economies of scale46. Indeed, for fear of future competition, 
                                                           
35 Schmauch (16), pp.23 and 29. 
36 Doganis (2), p.30. 
37 Cento (4), p.14 (see footnote No. 4). 
38 System of "double approval". See Schmauch (16), p.22. 
39 Doganis (2), p. 30. 
40 See the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. Para. 1-7, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A Para. 12-27, 
38 Stat. 730 (1914) which prohibited monopolies, cartels and practices such as price fixing.  
41 See the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 18 April 1951, Chapter 6. 
42 Schmauch (16), p.25. 
43 Doganis (2), p.31. 
44 Doganis (2), p.31. 
45 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
46 Schmauch (16), p.26. 
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airlines tried to extend their network and strengthen their position through merger. But the 
deregulation had also the effect to permit the entrance of new players on the market, some of which 
set up an intriguing business model, the low cost carriers ("LCC")47. Then, a consolidation of the market 
took place. And finally, bankruptcy and taking over happened and an oligopolistic market was 
observed. But, the market players also found a way to prevent new entry through marketing strategy 
and concentration. This situation led to a debate on a possible re-regulation. But in the same time, 
low prices resulted from the deregulation to the benefits of the consumers. And from a competition 
view, the improvement of social welfare is of importance when assessing competition in a market.  
The conclusion to give on deregulation is that it does not necessary guarantee competition by itself. 
The countries which decide to deregulate must have recourse to parallel measures protecting 
competition48. Companies on a specific market will always try to secure their position, and this can 
lead to extreme measures or decisions. Competition rules are there to draw a limit.  
5.4. The following liberalization in Europe 
In Europe, a gradual liberalization49 movement started a few years later and was the result of three 
packages which "led to increased competition, decreased average fares, increased frequency, 
improved load factor and airline efficiency and increased traffic volumes and new route services50".  
To summarise the situation in Europe before liberalization, the problems were the following: high 
prices, inefficient airlines (involved in diversified activities) in conjunction with an extremely 
fragmented market51.  
As said before, the competition rules were not applied to air transport because, according to the 
commission, it could have "cause serious disturbance in view of the special aspects" of this type of 
transport52. But, inspired by the US, the Commission was in favour of changes within the European 
legal framework and proposed a set of new measures in a memorandum53. Nonetheless, it is only in 
the early 1980s that concrete measures were adopted.  
                                                           
47 Schmauch (16), p.26. 
48 Schmauch (16), p.27. 
49 Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities (2002), Competitive Airlines - Towards a more Vigorous 
Competition Policy in Relation to the Air Travel Market, Report No. 1/2002, pp.15-16: it took a decade and it 
has still to be completed (Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities). 
50 Peoples (6), Chapter 2 p.18.  
51 Schmauch (16), p.27. 
52 Schmauch (16), p.30. 
53 European Community (1979), 'Civil Aviation Memorandum No.1 - The Contribution of the European 
Communities to the Development of Air Transport Services', COM(79) 311 (Civil Aviation Memorandum No.1) 
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Directive 83/416/EEC54 is the starting point of the European liberalization. It bypassed traditional ASA 
by allowing the development by airlines of new routes between very small airports. And, even if in the 
end the directive had a very limited scope of application, It was the first attempt to question the 
Chicago Convention. Then, in 1984, the Commission introduced a second memorandum, whose 
recommendations set the basis of what will be the first package adopted in 1989 by the Council.  
5.4.1. The three packages 
The first package55 followed and confirmed an ECJ decision56 according to which competition rules 
applied to air transport. The Commission was nonetheless allowed to grant exemptions to these rules, 
and as a result the first package had a limited impact. Additionally, no mention to state aid was made 
even though this had, in an industry such as air transport, a special and contestable place. 
The second package57 was adopted by the Council in 1990 and focused on tariffs and market access. 
Also, it prohibited pooling agreement between airlines, measure in line with a free competition ideal. 
In the same time, the situation of the industry was unsteady, and many airlines were having financial 
troubles as a result of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq which led to an increase of the price of oil. States 
intervened, but it also instigated a restructuration of the industry. 
                                                           
54 See European Council, Directive 83/416/EEC of 25 July 1983 concerning the authorization of scheduled inter-
regional air services for the transport of passengers, mail and cargo between Member States, OJ L 237, 
26.08.1983, p.19-24. 
55 The 1st package includes: European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down 
the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, OJ L 
374, 31.12.1987, p.1; European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application 
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport 
sector, OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p.9; European Council, Directive 87/601/EEC of 14 December 1987 on fares for 
scheduled air services between Member States, OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p.12; and European Council, Decision 
87/602/EEC of 14 December 1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air 
services between Member States and on access for air carriers to scheduled air-service routes between 
Member States, OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, p.19. 
56 See joint cases 209/84 to 213/84, Ministère Public v Asjes, 14 July 1998, EU:C:1998:357; and Schmauch (16), 
p. 34. 
57 The second package includes: European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for 
scheduled air services, OJ L 217, 11.8.1990, p.1; European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 2343 /90 of 24 July 
1990 on access for air carriers to scheduled intra-Community air service routes and on the sharing of 
passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between Member States, OJ L 217, 
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concerted practices in the air transport sector, OJ L 217, 11.8.1990, p.15. 
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The third package58 made its apparition in 1993 and created an "open skies regime for air services in 
the EU"59. The package focused on airlines operating licenses, access to intra-community routes and 
fair and rates for air services60. The control on airlines' prices disappeared61. Also, we have to wait until 
1997 to recognize full cabotage rights in the EU. the third package was repealed and modernized by 
Regulation 1008/2008 on 24 September 2008.  
5.4.2. The limits of the three packages 
The summarize, the third package has created a Single Aviation Market in the EU, but agreements 
with third country were and remain necessary to organize air transport at a global level. This situation 
has two essential implications for airlines businesses: one regarding the routes concerned and the 
second as to the negotiation of nationality or ownership clauses62.  
Indeed, the opening of the European market to airlines had a limit. Member States had to conclude 
individual bilateral agreements with Third Parties, and therefore they could only establish a route with 
a third country starting from they own territory. For example, it was not possible for an airline owned 
and controlled by a Member State other than Spain, to connect Madrid to LA, even though the airline 
had complete access to the Spanish market following 1992.  
And additionally, nationality or ownership clauses (included in ASA with third countries) were in a 
sense conflicting with the idea behind the creation of the internal market, and the possibility airlines 
have to establish themselves freely where they want within the Community63. The Commission opined 
that the Community was responsible for negotiating ASA with third countries64.  
5.4.3. A European response to traffic rights 
                                                           
58 The third package includes: European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 of 23 July 1992 on licensing of 
air carriers, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, p.1; European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 2408 / 92 of 23 July 1992 on 
access for Community air carriers to intra-Community air routes, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, p.8; European Council, 
Regulation (EEC) No 2409 / 92 of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air services, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, p.15; 
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the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, OJ L 
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practices in the air transport sector, OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, p.19. 
59 Doganis (2), p.46. 
60 Schmauch (16), p.39. 
61 Doganis (2), p.46. 
62 Schmauch (16), p.53. See also Doganis (2), p.46. 
63 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council on Air Transport Relation with 
Third Countries, COM(92) 434 final, Para. 5. 
64 Ibid., para.. 50 and following. 
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This is in this context that intervened the open skies judgments in 2002. Indeed, several EU Member 
States had concluded an "open skies" agreement with the US, such as the Netherland, one of the 
pioneers in 1992 but also Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden. 
And the Commission was unsatisfied with this situation because, according to its view, traffic rights 
were not at the discretion of Member States as they could affect trade. But the situation was also 
undermining the Commission power65. In the same way, it was rendering the air industry complex and 
this was not in favour of a competitive framework. It led to an "asymmetry and an imbalance of 
opportunities"66 between the US and the EU due to the nature of both territories. To illustrate the 
situation, the fifth freedom on beyond rights was available only for the US but not for the EU 
members67. This right allows an airlines to take passengers from its own country (A), to fly them to a 
destination (Country B) where it will pick new passengers to carry them to another country (C). In 
practice, an US airline could flight NY-Lisbon-Madrid, but the other way around was not possible for a 
Spanish airline.  There were no equivalence of rights. 
During the proceedings before the ECJ, the Commission argued, firstly, that it had exclusive 
competence to negotiate air transport agreements with third countries such as the US. Indeed, 
following Article 84(2) EC Treaty68, and its application in the AETR judgment69, once the Community 
has legislated in a specific field such as air transport, it has automatic competence to negotiate with 
third countries (recourse to the doctrine of implied powers70). Also, those agreements have affected 
the internal market and they allowed for discrimination between community airlines, but they also 
undermined the right of establishment within the Community. They were not in line with EU law. 
The Court recalled the AETR rule regarding the doctrine of implied powers and ruled that if the 
Member States could freely "enter into international commitments affecting the common rules 
adopted on the basis of Article 84(2) of the Treaty, that would jeopardise the attainment of the 
objective pursued by those rules and would thus prevent the Community from fulfilling its task in the 
defence of the common interest71". The concern of the Court was therefore to observe whether the 
                                                           
65 Doganis (2), p.53. 
66 Doganis (2), p.52. 
67 European Commission, 'Open skies agreements : Commission welcomes European Court of Justice ruling', 
IP/02/1609, 5 November 2002, Para. 11 p.2. 
68 Then, Article 80 TEC and now Article 100 TFEU. 
69 C-468/98, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Sweden, 5 November 2002, 
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bilateral agreements concluded with the US could have an impact on the common rules72. Therefore, 
Member States can negotiate and conclude bilateral agreement with third countries as long as the 
matter has not fallen within the Commission's competences yet73.   
Also, as to the concerns of discrimination between airlines,  distortion of competition in the internal 
market and  the right of establishment, the Court confirmed the view of the Commission by stating 
that traditional nationality or ownership clauses were contrary to EU law74. 
Nonetheless, following the 2002 judgements, the Commission was given mandate to negotiate 
agreements with third parties on the behalf of the Member States. And, in 2004 followed a Regulation 
on air service agreement negotiation and implementation between the EU and third countries75 to 
clarify the situation and avoid further issues. (The matter is currently organized under Articles 100, 
207(5) and 218 TFEU).  
The 2002 judgment gave rise to several open-skies agreements such as the US-EU agreement from 
2007. This agreement was a step forward, it has opened the two territories to airlines competition by 
allowing, without discrimination, access to the US sky to any "community air carriers"76 with no 
restriction on origin and destination. Additionally, community airlines are now allowed to realize "stop 
over" in the US, that is to make a stop but to continue after to the final destination situated in another 
country. This has to be differentiate nonetheless with cabotage rights and domestic transport was not 
part of the deal77.  
But the open skies agreement also allows US investors to be minority shareholders in EU airlines (49%) 
and EU investors can detain 25% of the voting share in a US carriers. This is a huge step toward a 
limitation of the nationality or ownership clauses, even if the US remain protectionist to some extent78 
and maintain a certain contradictory position79. For example, the US did not react when Virgin Atlantic, 
a British airline which is operating routes to the US, sold 49% of its stake to Singapore Airlines in 199980. 
But, otherwise, Singapore Airlines would not be allowed to purchase 49% of an US airline. The road is 
                                                           
72 Commission v Sweden (69), para. 83. 
73 Doganis (2), p.63. 
74 Linked to Article 52 TEU (now Article 59 TFEU) on liberalization. 
75  European Parliament and European Council, Regulation (EC) No 847/2004 of 29 April 2004 on the 
negotiation and implementation of air service agreements between Member States and third countries, OJ L 
157, 30.4.2004.  
76 Cento (4), p.17. 
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78 See the Fly America Act, 49 U.S.C. 40118.  
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long before countries agree on dropping out nationality or ownership clauses, the same provisions 
that in the past helped them to support and sustain their airlines81. Thereafter, the open skies 
agreement was completed in 2010 regarding environmental issues82. 
5.5. The importance of competition in the airline industry 
In the end, there is only a few of regional open-skies83 such as the Single European sky or more recently 
the open skies created by the ASEAN (2015). But the trend is changing even if we are far from a global 
competitive market for airlines. For example, in 2005, a European Common Aviation Area was agreed 
upon between the EU and some of its neighbours, including new partners such as Albania, Iceland and 
Norway84 creating an enlarged open-skies area in Europe.  
Also, to understand why fair competition is important in the airline industry, it should be noted that 
airlines are key actors in the economic development of regions and cities. Transport services and 
infrastructures in the EU have to be seen as a support to other industries, they form an essential link 
and promote economic growth in the internal market in general85. This also explains why the 
construction or the extension of an airport can be highly political86. Additionally, the fact that the 
strategic development of an airline has an impact and even stimulates other industries such as tourism 
and trade87 justifies the interest Member States have shown with regard to their flag carriers in the 
past. For example, when an airline decides to open a new route, the cities concerned will consequently 
receives more travellers-visitors and will have to adapt their infrastructures. Also, the shutting down 
of a route has economic consequences88.  
5.6. The difficulties faced by airlines 
One of the problem of the airline industry is its tendency to be oligopolistic, and airlines can be 
tempted to behave in an anti-competitive manner89.   
                                                           
81 Doganis (2), p.57. 
82 Peoples (6), Chapter 2, p.17. 
83 Peoples (6), Chapter 2 p.12. 
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85 European Commission, Network Industries - Transport  
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/15_transport_02.pdf. 
86 Current example of Notre Dame des Landes's Airport in Nantes, France. 
87 Peoples (6), Chapter 2 pp.3-6. 
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"Implications for Destinations when Low-Cost Carrier Operations are Disrupted: The Case of Tiger Airlines 
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This is linked to its complexity and special feature. Indeed, this industry is highly dependent on 
infrastructure and countries relationships. Obtaining the right to fly over another territory is significant 
for political but also economic reasons. When one want to analyse the airline industry, one must 
understand that airlines are in a way dependant from external elements such as airports, passengers 
and states regulations. Moreover, the airline industry is inherently unstable90.  
Additionally, it takes time and money for an airline to set a new route. Airlines are not footloose91, 
they cannot easily switch from one airport to another. In a way, airports are the one having market 
power, they have limited facilities and slots which render them strategic from a competition 
perspective. And therefore when an airline decides to set a new route from a specific airport it will 
not be in the best position to negotiate a vertical agreement with the airport. The access to the 
facilities is essential and will be discussed further. 
5.7. A new structure of competition influenced by the appearance LCC 
Nonetheless, if we come back to the liberalization process in the EU, other than a oligopolistic 
reaction, the single aviation market has witnessed the apparition and development of Low Cost 
Carriers ("LCC")92, a new form of airline business model, in Europe. The phenomenon was the same 
than during the US deregulation process. It had the effect to increase competition and consumer 
choice, and lower prices93. 
But, to fully understand the impact of LCC on the industry structure, it is important to define what it 
is, and how different it is from the other business models. It is sufficient to say here that three carrier 
models are usually compared. The LCC model, the Charter Carrier (CC) model and the Full-Service 
Carrier ("FSC") model. The LCC model is based on a cost cutting strategy and the airlines, also called 
"no frills" or "low cost" airlines, will compete on prices94. On the other hand, FSC95 are the former "flag 
carriers" which have a more complex organization and provide a larger range of services. To finish, CC 
(or "holiday carriers"96) provide flights outside normal schedules97 for the tourism industry. By outside 
schedule, it must be understood that the flights, even if they may be arranged on a regular basis, are 
more seasonal and flexible. The tickets are also sold in bulk.  
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The appearance of LCC is interesting but also brought its share of problems, especially when it comes 
to labour conditions. A more complete description and discussion will be hold later on within the 
thesis.  
The different business models have something in common, every time an airline plans to enter a new 
route, it must consider several elements, among other: airport rights (slots), staff, marketing issues, 
prices...98etc. And any posterior modifications will involve costs. The network is the cornerstone of an 
airline's business. Therefore, the network is at the heart of the competition concerns, and having a 
proper network strategy and planning is crucial. Depending on the business models, airlines choose 
most of the time to have recourse to a Hub-and-Spoke ("HS") system or a Point-to-Point ("PP") system 
(See diagram, Annex II) where airports have more or less importance and a strategic value.  
This is in this context that airlines may encounter difficulties to enter the market and that will 
intervene and be applied the competition rules. The main piece of legislation is contained within Title 
IV, Chapter 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") and particularly within 
Articles 101, 102 and 107 TFEU. These Articles prevent cartel and abuse of dominant position but also 
control structural changes, and the recourse to state aid within the internal market. Also, certain 
sectors such as transport, may be subjected to additional rules99.     
 
6. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INDUSTRY 
The functioning of the airline industry is interesting in many ways, and so is the application of 
competition law. When it comes to airlines and competition, three elements must be highlighted, the 
business model adopted by airlines (6.1.), their behaviour on the market (6.2.), and, to finish, the 
difficulties they may encounter (6.3.).  
 6.1. The airline industry 
The airline industry is characterized by a multiplicity of actors playing on different markets (6.1.1.), 
and using different business models (6.1.2.).   
6.1.1. A complex market definition 
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6.1.1.1. A brief reminder on competition law 
The first competition rules can be found in 1951 within the Treaty of Paris, but, since then, the rules 
have evolved and have been adapted to fulfil the changing objectives of the EU100.  
The goals pursued by competition law are not clearly defined and may slightly vary depending on the 
approach taken and the institutions or entities concerned. Nonetheless, it is commonly admitted that 
competition law tries to maintain an effective competition and to prevent partitioning and foreclosure 
on the market.  
In other words, it aims at promoting efficiencies and market integration, but also in certain cases, it 
pursues secondary objectives such as environment and job creation101. Competition law is a necessary 
tool to maintain an operative and integrated internal market102. Indeed, the logic behind the creation 
of the internal market is to pursue economic integration within the EU by creating "an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured" 
(Article 26.2 TFEU). But the internal market is not only about business and commercial activities, it 
also covers social, environment and consumer policies103.  
Nonetheless, the purpose of the internal market would be jeopardized if a firm could simply exclude 
competitors, divide the market or increase prices to the detriment of the consumers and competitors. 
Therefore the competition rules are there to allow market integration but also to promote consumer 
welfare and an efficient allocation of resources104. Also, in the last 30 years, a liberalization wave has 
passed the EU. There was a risk that the former markets dominated by state owned companies would 
fall under private monopoly105, therefore the adoption of new competition rules was crucial. This was 
particularly true within the transport industry.   
The maintenance of competition within the internal market relies on a collaborative system106 
between the EU and its Member States. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the implementing Regulations 
                                                           
100 Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law (Text, Cases, and Materials) (5th Edition, Oxfored 
University Press, 2014), p.35. 
101 Hans Henrik Lidgard, Part I Competition Classics (Material & Cases on European Competition Law and 
Practice) (Maria Magle Publishing, 2011), p.16. 
102 Jones and Sufrin (100), p.39. 
103 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca, EU Law (Text, Cases, and Materials) (5th Edition, Oxford University Press, 
2011), p.609. 
104 Jones and Sufrin (100), p.40. 
105 Jones and Sufrin (100), p.52. 
106 See C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG, 28 February 1991, EU:C:1991:91; European Council, 
Regulation 1/2003/EC of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1–25; and Lidgard (101), p.38. 
   
 
  
24 
 
 
 
 
have direct effect, and national courts are competent to apply them. Also, EU competition law is 
effect-based107, that is to say that it is not based on the form of the anti-competitive behaviour but on 
the impact an agreement, decision, concerted practice or behaviour may have or has within the 
internal market. Additionally, EU competition law may apply to a firm whose head office is located 
outside the EU as long as competition within the market is affected. This is referred as the 
extraterritorial application of EU competition law108. 
Regarding the assessment developed by the Commission under competition law, a few concepts call 
for explanations: the market power held by a firm, the definition of the relevant market, and to finish 
the existence of barriers to entry109.   
6.1.1.2. The notion of market power 
During a competition analysis, the first element to define is the market power of the firm(s) under 
scrutiny. It is at the core of any competition law analysis110. The concept of market power refers to the 
influence a firm may have on the market conditions111. This includes, on one hand, the possibility to 
exclude competitors (exclusionary power), but also, on the other hand, the ability to price over short-
run marginal cost112 i.e. over the "competitive price"  (pricing power)113.  
Nonetheless, competition is not limited to pricing practices, it is more subtle and it requires a dynamic 
assessment. For instance, competition is intertwined with issues such as innovation and intellectual 
properties. Innovation is considered as "the main avenue for achieving economic growth and 
competitiveness"114, and it will have an impact on consumer welfare.    
Back to the concept, market power must last for a significant period to be taken into account115, and 
there are two available methods to assess it. One consists on using economics data, but the most 
common approach is the structural approach, which consists on defining the relevant market, then 
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assessing the market power by defining the market share of the firms and the barriers to entry (see 
hereunder, 6.3.1).  
6.1.1.3. The particularities of the market definition in the airline industry 
The definition of the relevant market will be described through the airline industry filter and its 
distinctive features. To resume, a market definition involves a product market, a geographical market, 
but also a time factor116.  
The market definition aims at identifying "those actual competitors of the undertakings involved that 
are capable of constraining their behaviour and of preventing them from behaving independently of 
an effective competition pressure"117, and consequently revealing possible infringements of EU law118. 
This market definition is used both under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and for structural changes, but 
the Commission will have recourse to different types of evidence or sources of information119 
depending on the issue raised.  
The relevant product market will be delimited in function of the interchangeability or substitutability 
of the product from the buyer-consumer's position and in the present case, from the passenger's 
perspective as we are focusing on "air passenger services"120 (but airlines may also carry out other 
types of activities such as air cargo services or ground handling etc.).   
First, it should be noted that airlines compete on routes. Therefore the starting point of the analysis 
consists in defining the origin and destination city pair121. The airline industry competes on body of 
routes on which the level of competition varies depending on many factors, such as the existence of 
transportation alternatives.  
The Commission will realise a case-by-case analysis where it will assess airport or inter-modal 
transportation (train, ferry...) substitution but also travel time, frequency and schedule of service, or 
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the price and the quality of the service122. Those elements are influencing the decisions process of 
passengers. Also, the Commission will have recourse to the bundling evidence test to assess 
substitutable airports123.   
Additionally, the Commission traditionally distinguishes two groups of passengers: the time-sensitive, 
flexibility-focused passengers, and the non time-sensitive but price-focused passengers124. This 
distinction is only relevant for intra-European routes, where it can lead to a separate market 
definition125. There is also a difference as to the market definition whether the ticket is or not 
restricted126.  
Moreover, the Commission considers that passengers and connecting passengers are not part of the 
same market127. For example, a passenger reserving an indirect flight from Toulouse to Copenhagen, 
with a stop in Brussels, will not be on the same market as a passenger flying only from Toulouse to 
Brussels.   
But, a direct flight and an indirect flight (sharing the same origin and destination) may be part of the 
same relevant market. Indeed, the level of substitution between the two routes will vary in function 
of the duration of the flights128. According to the Commission, "as a general rule, the longer the flight, 
the higher the likelihood that indirect flights exert a competitive constraint on direct flights"129. 
Nonetheless, at an intra-European level, it is unlikely that an indirect flight will be substitutable to a 
direct short-haul route, as the indirect flight will not exert a sufficient competitive restraint (but it may 
be different on a medium-haul route)130.  
Once the relevant product market has been defined, the geographic market must be identified. This 
must comprise the internal market or a substantial part of it for the competition rules to apply.  Also, 
the market must contain homogeneous conditions of competition131, distinct from those existing 
within neighbouring areas. In practice, it means that you can individualise the market because of its 
                                                           
122 See Michael Gremminger, The Commission's approach towards global airline alliance - some evolving 
assessment principles, 2003, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 1, Spring 2003 p.75, and Case M.7333 - 
Alitalia/Etihad (120). 
123  Case M.7333 - Alitalia/Etihad (120), para. 84. 
124 See Case M.7333 - Alitalia/Etihad (120), para. 70. And, European Commission DG Competition, Competition 
Impact of Airline Code-Share Agreements, Final Report, January 2007, pp. 71-72. 
125 Michael Gremminger (122), p.75. 
126 Michael Gremminger (122), p.75. 
127 Case M.7333 - Alitalia/Etihad (120), para.. 64. 
128 Case M.7333 - Alitalia/Etihad (120), para.. 75-76. 
129 Case M.7333 - Alitalia/Etihad (120), para. 76. 
130 Michael Gremminger (122), p.75. 
131 C-27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European 
Communities, 14 February 1978, EU:C:1978:22, Para. 39. 
   
 
  
27 
 
 
 
 
characteristics. Also, potential substitution is not enough to define a market, and the Commission 
must take into consideration the time factor132.  
It is apparent through the description of the relevant market definition that airports are one of the 
key element within route competitions, they are the origin or the destination of a flight. But, 
depending on their business model, airlines will develop different approaches towards airports and 
the structure of their network. 
6.1.2. A competition between business models? 
As previously stated, three different models can be described133: the Low Cost Carrier (LCC) model, 
the Charter Carrier (CC) model and the Full-Service Carrier (FSC) model.  
6.1.2.1. The FSC model 
FSC have a diversified business tradition (passenger, cargo, maintenance) and have developed a hub-
and-spoke system where one airport, the hub, is selected to be at the core of the airline network and 
all flights will be directed towards it. Its playground will consist on domestic, international and 
intercontinental markets. But the FSC also have recourse to alliances to extend their network. Their 
give special attention to their customer, and have recourse to frequent flyer program and customer 
relationship management. But the FSC model is also characterised by its sophisticated yield 
management (see explanation 6.2.2.1). And tickets can be bought either online or outline through 
travel agencies or the airline itself. Typical examples of FSC would be Lufthansa or Air France-KLM. 
Nonetheless, this traditional model has been challenged by a simpler and cost-reducing model: the 
LCC model. 
6.1.2.2. The LCC model 
The LCC is a simplified model that aims at reducing costs, and therefore lower prices to attract 
customers. Three lines of conduct can be listed: unbundled services, reduction of operating costs and 
maximizing revenue134. 
To resume some of the features of this specific model, LCC focus on passenger service, and have 
recourse to a point-to-point system. Such a system implies that a passenger will only fly from A to B, 
and no connecting flights will be arranged by the airline. Besides, LCC only serve continental routes 
(short and medium haul flights) and usually the airports included within their network are secondary 
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airports (example: Malmö airport) where access is easier and cheaper (reduced airport charges, 
possibility to obtain state aid to open new routes under certain conditions etc.).  
Also, LCC usually have a fleet composed of a single type of aircrafts which will spend more time in the 
air per day than an FSC aircraft would. There is an optimization of the use of aircrafts. It should be 
noted that part of the strategy may also consist on leasing recent aircrafts to avoid maintenance 
costs135. As to the choice of routes, two trends are visible, the LCC will focus either on busy routes or 
on niches (i.e. routes not served by FSC). 
The beneficiaries of FSC are the public and mainly for a leisure market136. Contrary to FSC, LCC do not 
provide differentiated services for passengers. There is no lounge, no possibility to choose a seat or to 
refund a ticket for example. To increase their revenue, LCC rely on optional services such as hotel and 
car renting (commission system), excess luggage charges, in-flight catering. Nonetheless the LCC 
model is not uniformly applied. Indeed, the LCC have unbundled the traditional range of services 
provided by FSC137. Additionally, the distribution is organized online: Internet has played a role in the 
development of the LCC138.  
Furthermore, part of the strategy of LCC is related to their labour force: lower wages for less generous 
working conditions139. Labour costs are reduced. LCC crew will avoid overnight stay and the companies 
will also have recourse to casual employment. There are positive and negative aspects stemming from 
the implementation of the LCC model. The difference between FSC and LCC appears at different levels, 
it is multifaceted140. Typical examples of LLC would be Ryanair and Easyjet. 
6.1.2.3. The CC model 
The main business activity of CC consists on transporting holiday-markers to tourist destinations. 
Tickets are sold by tour operators, and usually are part of a package holiday. Such airlines are usually 
vertically integrated and all the links are connected: airlines, tour operators, hotels and ground 
transportations among others. The CC model focuses on economy of density, all the seats must be 
reserved. Typical examples of CC would be Condor or Thomson Airways. Nonetheless, this distinction 
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between airlines' business model is too rigid. The airline industry has witnessed the development of 
hybrid models141. 
6.2. Airlines' behaviour on the market 
When we look at airline demand from a passenger perspective two elements are important, the cities 
served (the origin and destination city pair) and the airline "reputation" (e.g. quality of the service)142. 
How do airlines compete on both sides? 
6.2.1. How do airlines compete? 
To compete and to face internal or external situations, airlines have recourse to a plurality of methods.  
6.2.1.1. Cost limitation and pricing method 
Airlines compete on cost reductions, especially following the entry on the market of LCC. But cost 
reduction has a limit and the market has gained a certain level of maturity143. As regards cost 
reduction, airlines' strategies are driven by concepts such as economies of scale, scope and density 
which can be studied both on the supply side and the demand side144. The key factor to take into 
consideration when assessing these concepts is the price per unit borne by airlines.  
In the airline industry the concept of economies of scale means that the bigger the plane is, the 
cheaper a seat costs for the airline (if a demand for such an aircraft exists, i.e. all seats reserved)145. 
From a passenger perspective, it would be translated as the bigger the plane is, the safer and more 
comfortable it would appear146.  
On an other hand, the idea of economies of density implies that increasing the number of seats 
available in an aircraft or increasing the flights' frequency on a route (where there is a demand) will 
decrease the unit cost147.  
To finish, the idea behind the economies of scope is to maximize the network and to offer a large panel 
of services. It will reduce the cost per unit and attract passengers. Into practice, the airlines will set up 
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more interconnected destinations (e.g. recourse to connecting flights), where aircrafts and crew will 
be "re-used"148.  
Nonetheless, in the following years, airlines may have to address several challenges such as a possible 
increase of fuel price, labour costs but also costs of aircraft leasing. Those increases will have a 
particular impact on LCC whose main business strategy consists on reducing costs to the minimum. 
Fuel, among other, is an unavoidable expenditure. Airlines already try to minimize the impact of fuel 
price variation by having recourse to fuel hedging (i.e. purchase of a stock of fuel at a fixed price) which 
permits to anticipate increase in price149. In this regard, FSC have an advantage over LCC stemming 
from a higher seat density (i.e. the price of fuel per seat is less important). But competition is not only 
a question of prices, but also of products and services. 
6.2.1.2. Network use 
Each airline has a different approach to the way it should compete. The first aspect of competition 
depends on the choice of routes. For example, Ryanair tries to avoid certain competitors by running 
routes between regional airports, on smaller markets150. By consequence, its network is not 
intertwined with a lot of competitors.  
The second aspect of competition stems from the business model of the airlines, and a new trend has 
appeared within the FSC151: they have developed a multi-brand strategy consisting in diversifying their 
products by including LCC to their business model (it gives rise to concentration issues which will be 
scrutinized under competition law hereafter, 7.1.). They will also have recourse to advertisement to 
attract new consumers152.  
But the FSC also try to rationalize their network by focussing on profitable routes. Some FSC even have 
transformed themselves in LCC to be competitive and survive. To summarize, the key feature of FSC 
competition lies on a constant adjustment of their business model to remain competitive and viable. 
And in the end the main focus of the different business models is to reduce unit cost to compete on 
the market.  
6.2.1.3. Marketing tools 
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Airlines also compete through marketing strategy153. By marketing should be understood advertising 
but also loyalty schemes. Loyalty schemes can consist on frequent flyer programs, corporate discounts 
and travel agency commission overrides154. They aim at reducing prices but also demand elasticity, by 
guaranteeing that consumers remain loyal to one company. In this regard, such schemes will render 
switching cost between airlines prohibitive for consumers155.  
6.2.1.3.1. Frequent flyer programs 
Frequent flyer programs permit passengers to accumulate mileage points for each ticket bought from 
a specific airline (e.g. "Flying Blue" of Air France/KLM). The points thus earned can be exchanged for 
free or discounted tickets or for other form of benefits made available by the airline (lounge, free gift 
etc.)156, but in practice only 15 to 30 % of these points are redeemed157! This kind of loyalty scheme is 
principally addressed to business men and passengers who are not price-focussed. Such programs 
raise a question, how much a consumer choice is influenced by the loyalty scheme to which he is 
member. Indeed, from a consumer perspective, the possibility of obtaining points may convince a 
passenger to select a specific flight even though another flight with another company would have be 
more convenient or economic. Therefore, frequent flyer programs have been seen as constituting 
barriers to entry on the market158.   
6.2.1.3.2. Corporate discounts 
Corporate discounts are "agreements by which large airline customers are able to negotiate lower 
(net) fares on all or certain parts of an airline's network"159. These agreements may vary depending on 
the airline and the company concerned. It may provide for upfront discount and/or rebates and may 
cover different territories (global, regional, city-pair scheme) and different types of tickets (business, 
economy class etc.)160. 
6.2.1.3.3. Travel agency overrides 
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Travel agency commission overrides are addressed to travel agency company and aim at rewarding 
them for using the airline aircrafts. Their rest upon a system of targets and commission161. 
6.2.1.3.4. Loyalty schemes v. Competition rules  
As seen above, loyalty schemes are incentives used by airlines (mainly FSC) to retain customers and 
to draw new ones. Also, the impact of a loyalty scheme is linked to the dimension of the network 
maintained by an airline. To be efficient, a scheme must be implemented in a large network. In a small 
network, the passenger will have no other choice but to pick competitors to fly on certain routes, 
consequently the benefits of the scheme will be limited and the switching costs will be minimal; 
therefore the passenger will not know any deterrent effect from the scheme to change airline162. But 
those schemes may have anticompetitive effects163.  
There is no specific rule on loyalty programmes within the EU, and it is therefore necessary to assess, 
case-by-case, these schemes under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU164. What is the current situation in 
Europe? 
Frequent flyer programs are said to induce loyalty but also price-raising effects165. If we look at the 
SAS/Lufthansa decision166 regarding an alliance between SAS and Lufthansa, a pooling of the frequent 
flyer program was planned. The Commission took the view that it was likely to constitute a barrier to 
entry167. The Commission assessed the alliance as a whole under Article 101 TFEU, and considered 
that the passengers would benefit from such a structure168. Therefore, the Commission allowed the 
alliance (as an exemption under Article 101.3 TFEU) for a 10 year duration169 and under certain 
conditions170. One of the conditions consisted in giving the possibility for competitors to participate in 
the frequent flyer program developed by Lufthansa and SAS171.  
The approach taken by the Commission consists in widening the access to frequent flyer program to 
competitors. Currently, within the EU, only Sweden has intervened against such schemes, SAS's 
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frequent flyer program was prohibited on domestic routes served by several airlines (competitors)172. 
The ECJ did not have the opportunity to decide on frequent flyer programs for now.  
One of the possible path to obtain the prohibition a frequent flyer program would entail the drawing 
of a parallel between frequent flyer programs and the rebate system prohibited in the Michelin I173 
case under Article 102 TFEU174. 
Several types of rebates can be identify: quantity rebates, loyalty rebates, target rebates, loyalty-
inducing rebates, bundled rebates and/or targeted rebates175. According to the CJEU, rebates must 
derived from economic considerations176. And where quantity rebates are allowed, loyalty rebates are 
prohibited177 under Article 102 TFEU. One important element is that a rebate must not prevent a 
passenger from seeking a flight from a competitor. A passenger must not be deprived of his choice178.  
Loyalty rebates are problematic for two reasons, they discriminate between consumers, and exclude 
competitors. They can amount to an abuse of dominant position under Article 102 TFEU179.  
To come back to the Michelin I case, the system in place was a target rebate system promoting the 
sale of car tyres between Michelin and its dealers. The rebate was conditional on the dealers' ability 
to purchase more tyres than the previous year. It should be noted that no exclusive agreement or 
percentage of supplies from Michelin were required from the dealers180. Nonetheless, the problem of 
the scheme was its loyalty-inducing effect181 (it is sufficient for the scheme to be capable of having 
this effect, it does not need to be an actual effect182) and it had an exclusionary effect towards 
competitors. In the end, the scheme was abusive because "too vague, too individual and too 
selective"183. The case was confirmed in 2002184. Target rebates are not per se prohibited, but a 
                                                           
172 Market Court, MD 2001:4, Konsortiet Scandinavian Airlines System v. Konkurrensverket, February 27, 2001 
173 C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities, 9 
November 1983, EU:C:1983:313 (Michelin I) 
174 Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities  (49), p.115. 
175 Jones and Sufrin (100), p.455. 
176 Michelin I (173), para. 85. 
177 Michelin I (173), para.71. 
178 Lidgard (101), p.128. 
179 Jones and Sufrin (100), p. 458. 
180 Michelin I (173), para. 72. 
181 Michelin I (173), para. 73, 85 and 86. 
182 Jones and Sufrin (100), p. 469. 
183 Lidgard (101), p. 237. 
184 See European Commission, decision 2002/405/EC of 20 June 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (COMP/E-2/36.041/PO — Michelin), OJ L 143, 31.5.2002, p. 1–53, para. 263 and 264 
(Michelin II) 
   
 
  
34 
 
 
 
 
dominant undertaking is under a special responsibility "not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market"185. 
The later jurisprudence developments must also be analysed through the Tomra186 and Intel187 cases, 
which were given after the 2009 Guidance of the Commission in relation to exclusionary abuses188.  
To summarize, Tomra (a reverse vending machine supplier) had set an individualised retroactive 
rebate scheme to supermarkets. According to the Commission the company deliberately used the 
rebate system to exclude competitors189, and such a scheme had equivalent effect to a loyalty 
rebate190 and constituted an infringement of 102 TFEU.  
The Court recalled that an abuse of dominant position is an objective concept, no intent is required 
even though all the relevant facts surrounding the case must be considered191. 
In regard to the absence of proof that prices were lower than costs, the Court confirmed that it was 
not necessary to conduct an economic assessment of Tomra's prices192. But it was the effects of the 
rebates on competition, and more precisely whether it was capable of excluding competitors that 
mattered193. Also, in the present case, the scheme was not objectively justified194.  
In Intel, the firm granted rebates to four manufacturers provided that they would purchase "all or 
almost all" of their central processing units from it195. It was a conditional rebate scheme. The 
Commission's contested decision set that it was a fidelity rebate scheme, and following an as-efficient-
competitor test, it would foreclose such a competitor from the market196 and competitors could not 
compete on the merits197. 
This case draw a line between three kinds of rebates198: quantity rebates, which are allowed; 
exclusivity rebates, which are prohibited because of their loyalty effect; and, the others which must 
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be assessed to determine if they provide an advantage not based on any economic service (all the 
circumstances must be assessed). And following this distinction, the Court stated that the rebate 
scheme was an exclusivity rebate, and only an objective justification199 or deriving efficiencies 
benefiting consumers200 would prevent the scheme to be abusive under competition law. Additionally, 
the Court held that it is no necessary to realise an as-efficient-competitor test in a rebate case201. What 
matter is the foreclosure effect i.e. whether the it has been impossible or made more difficult for 
competitors to enter the market. In the end, the Court concluded that the scheme under scrutiny was 
capable of restricting competition202.    
Frequent flyer programs may also be compared to these controversial rebate schemes, as they may 
be loyalty-inducing even though passengers are not bound to purchase ticket solely from one airline 
or alliance. Advantages are conditional on a certain amount of miles. A frequent flyer program could 
perfectly constitute an abuse of dominant position under 102 TFEU.   
To continue on the discussion, travel agency commission overrides have been addressed in a similar 
manner and are compared to loyalty rebates203. An example of travel agency commission overrides 
was examined in the Virgin/British Airways decision204. British Airways established a retroactive target 
rebate scheme with its travel agents to encourage them selling their tickets to passengers. When the 
travel agents reached the objectives they were also receiving an increased commission on tickets sold 
before. The Commission concluded that the scheme had an exclusionary/loyalty effect such as the 
scheme in Michelin I205 and was applied in a discriminatory way to travel agents. Additionally, the 
exclusionary effect was not justified by any economic argument and efficiencies in the interest of 
consumers206. It was therefore abusive under Article 102 TFEU. The decision was upheld by the 
General Court and the ECJ207. Nonetheless, the recourse to travel agency commission overrides tends 
to diminish in the airline industry. 
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To conclude, a loyalty scheme may be found abusive whenever it has "tying effects, foreclosure effects, 
strong loyalty effects, strong exclusivity effects or if they are able to reduce or eliminate effective or 
potential competition"208. 
6.2.2. Yield management and pricing practices 
6.2.2.1. The concept of yield management 
Yield management has been defined by Kimes as "the application of information systems and pricing 
strategies to allocate the right capacity to the right customer at the right place at the right time"209. 
The application of yield management to airlines is the consequence of a complex industry where on 
one hand the demand is uncertain and on the other hand the supply of seat is limited and highly 
perishable210. It aims at maximising revenue.  
Yield management is a dual concept, it can either be quantity-based (see FSC) or price-based (see 
LCC)211. Indeed, the application of yield management differs between FSC and LCC. FSC will set 
different prices for different classes and will have to allocate a number of seats for each class. Such an 
organization implies several elements that should be highlighted. 
Yield management lead to market segmentation, product differentiation212 and to a system of price 
discrimination between passengers. Indeed, the airlines will have recourse to fences (i.e. the rule and 
condition of the tickets, such as a possible cancellation) which will justify the prices difference. 
But, to be efficient the system must properly identify the demand and allocate the seats to each group 
of passengers, knowing that the business class would generate higher profit than the economy class. 
This is known as the inventory control.  
To be certain to fully fill their aircrafts, airlines also tend to overbook their flights. They took into 
account possible passengers who will not show themselves at the airport (no-shows), and passengers 
with a ticket but no reservation for a specific flight (go-shows)213. This is done to maximize revenue.  
The  yield management developed by LCC is more clear. It is based on a simple idea: the earlier a 
passenger will book a flight the cheaper it will be. But in the end all the passenger will have the same 
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ticket. The main difficulty for a LCC will be to define the optimal price (i.e. the minimum and maximum 
prices and how it should progress in function of the dates of booking to load the aircraft)214. 
Additionally, price-based management may rely on the use of discount and promotions215. 
6.2.2.2. Pricing practices 
As to pricing in general, some behaviours are caught within the net of competition law: predatory 
price, price agreements between airlines... etc.  
6.2.2.2.1. Predatory prices 
Indeed, prices may create a barrier to entry and predatory prices are the perfect example. A predatory 
pricing is defined as "a practice whereby an undertaking prices its product so low that competitors 
cannot live with the price and are driven from the market"216.  
The recourse to predatory prices on one route can be prolific as to the protection of the entire network 
of an airline. Indeed, it will also send a clear message to competitors interested in entering the same 
market, and it can be compared to a threat217. Once the competitors will be excluded or prevented 
from entering, the airline will increase its prices (monopolistic prices) and recoup the losses stemming 
from the predatory behaviour218.  
A dominant airline setting predatory prices is abusing its position under Article 102 TFEU. The difficulty 
lies on the test used to distinguish a predatory price from a normal and competitive pricing practice. 
An error of assessment can be detrimental to the consumers.  
Nonetheless a cost-based test, which can be observed in the Akzo case219, is nowadays used as a 
standard by the courts. Akzo, a dominant company, had recourse to predatory prices to drive a 
competitor out of the market in the UK. According to the Akzo test:  
 prices below average variable costs are presumed abusive220; 
 prices below average total costs but above average variable costs are abusive if they are part 
of a plan for eliminating a competitor (i.e. intent)221; 
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 prices above average total cost are not abusive.  
One issue stemming from the test is the definition of what is exactly a variable cost or a fixed cost. 
Additionally, the test was modified in 2012 by the Post Danmark case222, and the average variable 
costs was replaced by the average incremental costs as a benchmark. Consequently, according to the 
new test: 
 Prices below average incremental costs are anti-competitive; 
 prices below average total costs but above average incremental costs are not automatically 
abusive, and no intent is required to prove a price to be abusive (focus on the anti-competitive 
effect only);  
 prices above average total costs are not abusive.   
Additionally, the cost-based test is combined with the as-efficient-competitor test (e.g. foreclosing a 
less efficient competitor cannot amount to an abuse) and the concept of competition on the merits223. 
This is also closely related to the special responsibility borne by dominant undertakings224. 
Nonetheless, low prices may be justified.  
6.2.2.2.2. Case-law: airlines and predatory prices 
To continue, due to the specific characteristics of the airline industry, two cases should be referred to: 
the Lufthansa/Germania case225 and the American case.  
The Lufthansa/Germania case is an interesting decision issued by the German Competition Authority. 
This decision concerned the Frankfurt-Berlin route on which Lufthansa had a monopoly until the entry 
of Germania on the market. Germania (a LLC) set a 99 euros one-way ticket and Lufthansa (a FSC) 
counterattacked with a 100 euro one-way ticket.  
The authority considered that Lufthansa 100 euros ticket was a cut-price predatory behaviour and 
imposed the company to charge a minimum of 35 euros more than its competitors on this route. This 
obligation would no longer be applicable if Germania would set a fare higher than 134 euros226. The 
reasons behind such a decision were the following: A) Lufthansa set such a tariff only on this specific 
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route227, and the services provided were not only different than those provided by Germania but also 
more advantageous228. Also, the tariff was not sufficient to cover average costs per paying 
customers229. B) There was no objective justification put forward, and the tariff had the effect to 
foreclose Germania from the market. 
This decision is controversial, as the authority did not apply the traditional cost-based test and has 
arbitrarily set a price ratio that had to be respected between the two undertakings for a 2 years period 
(the 35 euros difference)230. Nonetheless, we cannot deduce from this decision the reasoning the 
Commission or the CJEU may develop in similar circumstances. Proving a predatory behaviour is a 
complex matter.  
In the US, for instance, it appears more difficult to prove the predatory pricing of an airline company. 
In the American case 231, the FSC American matched the LCC prices, increased its capacity and had 
recourse to yield management232. The US government held that the increased of capacity led to losses 
and made no economic sense unless American aimed at eliminating competitors233. For the Court, two 
elements were essential to prove the predatory prices: a below-cost pricing and the demonstration of 
a dangerous probability to recoup losses234. In the Court's opinion, the US government failed to 
establish that prices were below-cost, and, supposing that the prices would have been below-cost, 
American's prices "only matched, and never undercut, the fares of the new entrant, low cost carriers 
on the four core routes"235. The US approach towards predatory prices is stricter than in the EU where 
the finding of predatory pricing is not conditioned to the possibility of recoupment236. 
6.3. What is important for airlines 
To enter the market, airlines may encounter numerous barriers (6.3.1.) before being able to settles 
their own network (6.3.2.), the cornerstone of their business. 
6.3.1. List of the main barriers to entry 
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Several barriers to entry can be enumerated here and will be further discussed in Part 6237. Barriers 
may stem from the relationship existing between an airport and airlines (regarding airport charges 
and other services available) and the issue of capacity (slot allocation)238. The access to airports is 
strategic and it will greatly influence the network of an airline. This is especially true when an airline 
has developed a hub-and-spoke system (importance of the hub premium)239. But barriers may also 
result from the collaboration of airlines through merger and acquisition, alliances or certain types of 
agreement (e.g. code share agreement240). A single airline may also by its behaviour have a negative 
impact on competition and create a barrier to entry (pricing practices)241. As described above, loyalty 
schemes may also form barriers, be it frequent flyer program or agreement concluded with travel 
agencies. The last elements which may have an impact on new players proceed from the regulatory 
framework, and an example would be the traffic rights or pricing restriction242.  
6.3.2. Importance of the network to compete 
As previously stated in the introduction, airlines, depending on their strategy, will adopt either a hub-
and-spoke system or a point-to-point system (see annex II). Both systems have their own advantages 
and drawbacks. Additionally a network can be extended through alliances with competitors.  
6.3.2.1. Choice of network 
The choice of the system is based on two factors: first, the location of the direct-flight demand, and 
then the potential of the market243. The network is usually organized following four steps: network 
strategy (i.e. to set the objectives of the network), network design (i.e. choice of the network structure 
and how the flight will be operated), alliances and to finish network planning (i.e. frequent 
adjustments of the network)244. Such a process will stretch over several years. 
It should also be recalled that an airline does not switch the nodes of its network very easily (i.e. 
airports). This can be explained both by the complexity of organizing a new network and its cost, but 
also by the behaviour consumers have on the market. Passengers have most of the time a 
predetermined origin and destination245, to which airlines will try to stick to. Additionally, the airline 
                                                           
237 For a more complete list see: Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities (49), p.13. 
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industry is highly competitive, and the players aim at maximizing their profits and have recourse to 
economy of scale, scope and density. Therefore, switching from one airport to another will only be 
considered where profitability will be on top246. So we can see that networks are complex and take 
time to be settled. Airlines will compete to obtain access to airports and their limited number of slots.  
6.3.2.2. The hub-and-spoke model 
An assessment of the hub-and-spoke structure is interesting. Indeed, such a system based on an hub 
airport permit to reach numerous destinations, which, if there were run through a point-to-point 
system, would not be viable247. Therefore hub-and-spoke systems increase the number of routes 
accessible to passengers. But on the other hand, an hub-and-spoke network is extremely complex to 
organize (e.g. connecting flight, capacity utilization and delay)248. 
Also, hub-and-spoke networks tend to favour one airport, the hub, and to give market power to the 
airline at this precise airport249.  It may be difficult for new players to access the hub airport and obtain 
slots and to operate flights (see Part 7.2.2). In these circumstances, most of the LCC prefer to pay 
attention to secondary airports and develop a point-to-point network.  
This is problematic. Detaining market power is not in itself contrary to competition law, but it may 
raise a concern where it prevents competition. Market power held at the hub may induce a reduction 
of competition but also the possibility for the airline to charge higher fares to passengers having for 
flight whose origin is the hub (i.e. hub premiums)250. Moreover, hub-and-spoke networks have the 
tendency to divide the market between airlines251. 
From a competition perspective it is commonly accepted that market sharing is prohibited within the 
internal market. This is clearly stated within Article 101.1.c TFEU and it has been accepted without 
contention as an abuse of dominant position252.   
In the end, the negative effects of the hub-and-spoke configuration must be balanced. It appears, 
certainly, that the combination of both system is advantageous to the passengers benefiting from a 
broadened choice of routes. Some routes would be inexistent outside an hub-and-spoke system. 
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Additionally, one of the problem highlighted here was the allocation of slots at the airport and the 
issue of airport limited capacity. Those problematics will be assessed within Part 7. The following Part 
will help us to assess how abuses of dominant position, cartel-like situations and others breach of 
competition are comprehended, and whether an efficient competition framework promoting 
consumer welfare has been established in the airline industry.  
 
7. THE ENTRY ON THE MARKET 
7.1. Airlines' interactions  
Airlines may decide to cooperate between each other to widen their market and improve their 
business. This can be translated into commercial (7.1.1.) or strategic alliances (7.1.2.).   
7.1.1. Commercial alliances 
7.1.1.1. Purposes 
An alliance is an agreement concluded between independent airlines which have decided to "integrate 
their networks and services and operate as if they were a single entity while retaining their corporate 
identities"253.  
Alliance is a generic word which embraces a diversity of agreements involving more or less integration 
(See Annex III). They can be global, regional or route-specific254. Alliances are concluded between 
either competitors (parallel alliances) or non-competitors (complementary alliances) and aim 
strategically at "capturing the market"255.  
Airlines usually decide to be part of an alliance for financial (e.g. difficulty to satisfy the demand), 
commercial (e.g. marketing and sales purposes) and/or political reasons (new international 
policies)256. An alliance may allow airlines to broaden the range of products they offer but also the 
geographical spread of their network while improving their image and reputation257. Nonetheless the 
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airline identity will be preserved. Some alliances are well-known by passengers such as Star Alliance, 
SkyTeam or One World.   
Being part of an alliance is challenging in the long term and airlines may face difficulties to secure their 
collaborations. Each member may pursue different goals through the alliance, some aim at surviving 
where other want to increase they market power for example. Alliances can also be used by small 
airlines to extend their network and to be able to compete on routes which were inaccessible 
before258.  
To sum up, alliances are concluded between companies with different enterprise culture and 
strategies, and the difficulty resides in finding  the proper balance between the interests of each 
party259.  
The second issue is linked to the nature of the collaboration. How independent are the airlines from 
each other? Can an airline decide to be part of two alliances in the same time260? The competition 
authorities will have to take that into account when they will assess such agreements.     
7.1.1.2 Types of commercial alliances 
To continue, alliances may involve different types of agreements: for instance, the recourse to 
interlining is a common practice which consists for an airline to accept/recognized the travel 
documents issued by another one to carry on the service261. This is when a passenger uses different 
airlines for a journey. 
Interlining, and alliances in general262, permit a certain rationalization of airlines' networks by allowing 
connecting flights between different airlines. Both airlines benefit from interlining which is a way to 
increase the demand and to fill an aircraft. Also, passengers will not have to check-in for the different 
flights, and the luggage will be forwarded to the final destination. Therefore passengers save time.  
Interlining agreements are distinct from code-sharing agreements which are agreements allowing an 
airline to market the flights of another airline. This is the "most common form of alliance in the airline 
industry"263. The "operating carrier" and the "marketing carrier" will both have their own code for the 
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same flight or will share a code264. These agreements can also spread to airlines which are not 
members of the same alliance265. Code-sharing is particularly interesting as to loyalty schemes as 
passengers can accrue points while travelling with another airline. Nonetheless passengers may also 
be disappointed on the service where the marketing carrier's reputation is better than the operating 
carrier one (different plane and services' standards)266.    
Airlines may also agree on a block-space agreement, the marketing carrier will reserve seats in a flight 
operated by another carrier. The marketing carrier will either agreed on a certain amount of seats for 
a certain price or will agreed to have the option to return unsold seats within a certain period267. The 
difference with a code-share agreement is that, in a block-space agreement, each airline manages its 
"own" seats (it is easier to supervise), when in an code-share agreement there is a pool of seats and 
both airlines must be coordinated so as to avoid selling (involuntary) twice the same seat, for instance. 
Other types of collaboration which will not be developed in the present thesis may also be concluded 
(e.g. franchise268, joint pricing, joint loyalty schemes, travel agents coordination), but those 
agreements may constitute a commercial alliance between airlines and have an influence on the 
competitive climate of the airline industry. 
First, they can reduce nay eliminate competition on a market and lead to a monopoly269. Two airlines 
can conclude a code-share agreement and agree that only one of them will undertake the flights. 
The second risk is that such agreements will increase the airlines' dominance on the market270. 
Dominance, by itself, is not sanctioned by competition law, but an airline could abuse its dominant 
position to the detriment of the consumers. A firm's dominance may also discourage other companies 
to enter the market. Hub dominance can also be achieved through alliances and by pooling available 
slots (See part 7.2.2 on slot allocation).  
Nonetheless the Commission does not stay idle and several tools are used to maintain efficient 
competition within the market. Such alliances may be analysed on a case-by-case basis under Article 
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101.1 TFEU which provides that the following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: 
"All agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market, and in particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or 
any other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, 
or investment; (c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts."  
Three criterions271 must be fulfilled for Article 101.1 TFEU to apply: we must have an agreement, 
capable of affecting trade (i.e. it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on 
the basis of a set of objective factors of law or fact that the agreement or practice may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States272) 
and competition in the market. 
When an agreement falls within the scope of Article 101.1 TFEU, it can either be block exempted under 
specific regulations (e.g. the Regulation on Technology Transfer Agreements273) or be subjected to an 
individual assessment under Article 101.3 TFEU274 to determine whether or not the restriction of 
competition can be compensated by any kind of efficiencies. The pro and anti-competitive effects of 
the agreement will be balanced. 
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Regarding the assessment, once the markets have been defined (see hereinabove Part 6.1.3. on the 
definition of the relevant market), the Commission will try to identify the position and relationships of 
the airlines on those markets. The Commission usually differentiates between two types of markets: 
overlap and non-overlap markets, depending on the existence of actual or potential competitors275. 
Then it will establish the market power of the different players on these markets, and identify the 
barriers to entry which are independent from the alliance members, but also the barriers created by 
the alliance. All the elements of an alliance are scrutinized. 
Concerning the market power definition, in the airline industry, a market share can be calculated with 
different tools, one of them for instance consists in calculating the number of ticket sold, but it can 
also stem from the flights frequency276. Nonetheless a high market share is not enough to render an 
alliance anti-competitive. Also in this specific industry, the passengers/buyers have a limited 
"countervailing power" which will not have a decisive influence on an airline market power277.  
If the agreement fall under Article 101.1 TFEU, airlines brought forward different kinds of efficiencies 
through Article 101.3 TFEU. For example the improvement of the quality and efficiency of the service, 
and of the network to the benefit of the consumers278. 
7.1.2. Structural changes 
7.1.2.1. Different forms of concentration 
We can differentiate between commercial and strategic alliances, involving either agreements or 
structural changes. Strategic collaborations can take the form of joint-ventures, mergers or 
acquisitions. The approach taken by the Commission is similar to the one described previously 
(definition of market, market power and analyse of the market structure).  
A joint venture (JV) is " an arrangement by which two or more undertakings, in order to achieve a 
particular commercial goal, integrate part of their operations, and put them under joint control"279 but 
two types of JV must be differentiated. Only a full function JV may fall within the scope of the Merger 
Regulation280 and will be considered as a concentration. Other JV fall under Article 101 TFEU. 
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According to Article 3.4 of the Merger Regulation: "The creation of a joint venture performing on a 
lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity shall constitute a concentration within 
the meaning of paragraph 1(b)". The paragraph 1(b) refers to the joint control of the JV either by way 
of purchasing securities or assets, by contract or any other means.   
Therefore to be considered full function, a JV must fulfilled three conditions which have been clarified 
in 2008 by the Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice281: i. existence of a joint control282; ii. the JV must 
detain, at least, operational autonomy283; and, iii. the JV "must be intended to operate on a lasting 
basis"284.  
Nonetheless, where a JV aims at coordinating the competitive behaviour of independent 
undertakings, such JV will fall under the scope of Article 101 TFEU285.  
A merger, on another hand, may consist on:  
 the amalgamation of "two or more independent undertakings into a new undertaking" which 
will "cease to exist as separate legal entities"286; 
 the absorption by one undertaking, which will retain its legal identity, of another undertaking 
which will cease to exist287; 
 A "de facto amalgamation" of undertakings into a single economic unit288. 
To finish, an acquisition occurs when an undertaking (or several undertakings) acquires direct or 
indirect control over another undertaking or part of it289. The notion of control is complex, and has 
been defined has the "possibility to exercise decisive influence" through Article 3.2 of the Merger 
Regulation. 
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In the airline industry, mergers and acquisitions have been difficult to implement on an inter-
continental level because of the ownership and nationality clause which may be agreed upon between 
countries290. Nonetheless at an European level, many concentrations can be observed. 
7.1.2.2 The competitive assessment of concentration 
The EU has developed a notification system which requires undertakings to notify new concentration 
before their implementation291. The implementation will only be possible once it has been declared 
compatible with the common market by the Commission292. Undertakings which fail to notify a 
concentration will be fined by the Commission293. Not cooperating honestly with the Commission may 
amount to same result. 
It should be noted that only concentrations having a community dimension are concerned294, and the 
Commission will assess whether the concentration under scrutiny may significantly impede effective 
competition or not295. Whether the undertakings are competitors and whether the competition can 
be eliminated must also be taken into consideration296.  
If the Commission finds that the concentration may be in breach of the competition rules, it can initiate 
proceedings297, at the end of which it may allow the concentration subject to certain conditions or 
obligations298. 
The competitive assessment can lead to a clearance or to the prohibition of the notified concentration. 
Two examples will be given to understand the way the Commission assess such cases: 
a) The Air France/KLM case (2004)299: the first significant cross-border concentration300. 
In 2003 was made a notification to the Commission according to which Air France was planning to 
acquire control over KLM. The plan was to have a three years transitional period during which Air 
France would have 100% economic interest but only 50% of the voting rights in KLM, then it would 
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291 Merger Regulation (280), Article 4. 
292 Merger Regulation (280), Article 7.1. 
293 Merger Regulation (280), Article 14. 
294 Merger Regulation (280), Article 1. See also: Ryanair/Aer Lingus (309), para. 18. 
295 Merger Regulation (280), Articles 2.2 and 2.3. 
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have 100% of both economic interest and of the voting rights301. The concentration was found 
compatible with the common market after the parties proposed some modifications to maintain 
competition. Both parties were FSC, using a hub-and-spoke network system and were partially 
controlled by France and the Netherlands respectively.  
Three relevant markets were distinguished and defined302 by using the origin and destination city-pair 
approach. During the competitive assessment, the Commission drew a picture of the existing alliances 
of both airlines (among others: Air France was a Skyteam member, Air France JV on Paris-Prague with 
CSA Czech Airlines or KLM JV with Northwest), and concluded Paragraph 62 that the proposed 
concentration would have an impact on competition between both Air France and KLM but also 
between them and their partners. This concentration would have world wide competition 
implications303. 
Several interesting elements can be highlighted through the case. For instance, the Commission 
assessed the network effect of the concentration following a critic brought by competitors according 
to which this concentration would "effectively reduce the number of worldwide alliances from 4 (…) to 
3"304. The Commission found that the network effect was not raising serious doubts as to 
competition305. Indeed, the Commission recalled that it was still possible for competitors to conclude 
interlining or code-share agreements with members of the alliances to enter the markets306. 
Additionally, potential competition could put pressure on the behaviour of the existing market 
players307. Moreover, the parties committed themselves to remove the competitive concerns 
stemming from the proposed concentration308 through several measures.  
The proposed commitments were the following:  
 To make available slots on short haul/European routes and on long-haul/intercontinental 
routes, at several airports, and for an unlimited period; 
 Frequency freeze (i.e. not to add any flight between Paris-Amsterdam, Lyon-Amsterdam and 
with a certain flexibility between Amsterdam-New York for six IATA seasons); 
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 To allow new entrants to enter into interlining with Air France/KLM on the city pairs 
concerned; 
 To allow new entrants to enter special prorate agreement; 
 To open the frequent flyer program to new entrants under the same conditions granted to 
partners; 
 To enter into inter-modal agreement if requested by a railway or surface transport companies; 
 To enter into block-space agreement with potential new entrants on certain defined routes; 
 To apply equivalent fare reduction between Paris-Amsterdam and Lyon-Amsterdam. 
The Commission was satisfied with the commitments309 because, as to the slots, the measure was not 
limited in time, and allowed new entrants to obtain grandfather rights for slots (will be clarify Part 
7.2.2). Also the slots, if not operated by a new entrant, would be given back to the slot coordinator.  
This means, to simplify, that Air France / KLM by this commitment give away slots, which are extremely 
essential to develop a network, to competitors without compensation and it will be difficult to get the 
slots back. The last commitment is also interesting as it prevents predatory prices: it will be more 
costly for Air France/KLM to implement such a strategy, in addition to the possibility to be fined for it 
under competition law. 
The Air France/KLM concentration was a success but it is not always the case. The Ryanair / Aer 
Lingus310 case was a failure, and it is interesting to compare the two cases to comprehend the 
reasoning and assessment of the Commission. 
b) Ryanair / Aer Lingus case: a failure 
To summarise, in 2006, a notification was send to the Commission according to which Ryanair was 
planning to acquire the control of Aer Lingus. From the Commission's perspective such concentration 
was raising serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and the Commission 
launched an investigation.  
Some diverging opinions were supported regarding the community dimension of the concentration. 
Indeed this case was specific for many reasons: at the difference of Air France and KLM, Ryanair and 
Aer Lingus were typical LCC operating on a point-to-point basis311. Moreover, the two airlines were 
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leading airlines on the Irish market312 and held 80% of the scheduled flight traffic from and to Dublin313! 
The particularity of the case was also stemming from the fact that all the affected routes were from 
or to Ireland314. It should also be noted that the origin and destination approach was used to defined 
the relevant markets, even though an alternative was proposed to define a bundle of flights as a 
market315. 
The Commission found that: the two airlines had a high market share on numerous routes (risk of 
monopoly on 22 out of 35 overlapping routes after the concentration)316; they both had strong 
position in Ireland, and few competitors317; Ryanair and Aer Lingus were each other closest 
competitors on routes from and to Ireland318 and their services were substitutable. 
Such a concentration would limit competition to the detriment of the passengers: price increases but 
also lower choice of service and quality. Additionally, there was a risk of decrease of the number of 
new route opening319.  
The concentration would also have for effect to increase the barriers to enter the market (experience 
and brand reputation advantage of Aer Lingus and Ryanair v. marketing and sunk costs to be borne by 
new entrants). Also, entering a new market is difficult by itself because the new entrant must acquire 
slots both at the origin airport and at the destination airport320. 
The question was therefore to determine if any efficiencies could stem from the concentration to 
balance the previous conclusions. Ryanair invoked cost savings which would have been passed on to 
consumers by way of reduced fares, better quality of products and services among other321. This was 
contested by Aer Lingus. Then, the Commission concluded that such efficiencies were not verifiable322. 
Ryanair proposed also several commitments323: 
 To make slots available for Air France and British Airways at Heathrow (London); 
 To make slots available, when necessary, at Dublin / Cork / Shannon airports; 
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 To reduce Aer Lingus fares by at least 10%, to operate Aer Lingus (own retained brand) and 
Ryanair separately;  
 It agreed on frequency freeze. 
For the Commission, those commitments lacked clarity and where not sufficient to protect 
competition in the common market. The commitments were too muddled and did not even respect 
the model text proposed by the Commission. They would therefore be difficult to implement. To 
conclude, the concentration was declared incompatible with the common market324!  
In 2009, a second notification for the same concentration was made but withdrawn. In 2012, a third 
notification was made and the Commission started again a new investigation but the outcome 
remained the same: the commitments were found insufficient to protect competition on the market. 
It should be noted that the final commitments of Ryanair were more technical and detailed than 
previously. They consisted in a divestment business plan to Flybe (a LLC), slot divestures and the 
opening of the frequent flyer programme. Nonetheless, commitments must be assessed on a case by 
case basis.  
The Commission recalled that "the commitments have to eliminate the competition concerns entirely 
and have to be comprehensive and effective in all respects. In assessing whether proposed 
commitments are likely to eliminate the competition concerns identified, the Commission will consider 
all relevant factors including inter alia the type, scale and scope of the proposed commitments, judged 
by reference to the structure and particular characteristics of the market in which the competition 
concerns arise, including the position of the parties and other participants on the market"325326.  
c) What can be concluded from both cases?  
Airlines have to notify any concentration having a community dimension. When doing do, they should 
be prepared to justify it (existence of efficiencies) and to propose commitments.  
The purpose of such commitments is to limit the possible anti-competitive effect of the alliance327. 
They may include obligations as to the frequency of the flights, the access to loyalty schemes, tariff, 
                                                           
324 Ryanair/Aer Lingus (310), para. 1240. 
325 European Commission, decision in relation to a notified concentration, Case No COMP/M.6663 – RYANAIR/ 
AER LINGUS III, C(2013) 1106 final, para. 1673 (Ryanair /Aer Lingus III) 
326 See also: European Commission, Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 , OJ 2008/C 267/01, para. 5, 9 and 12. 
327  Overview on Merger and alliances in civil aviation (253), p. 31-32. 
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the agreement concluded within the alliance (e.g. interlining) and even the sale of certain assets328. 
But the most common remedy consists in giving up a certain number of slots329 to competitors. 
When drafting a commitment involving slots, an airline must be careful to respect a proper form. The 
commitment should be detailed and include the mechanism to be used, the number of slots which 
will be given away, the circumstances under which the slot will be usable by the competitor330. To 
finish, showing good intention is not enough, the Commission expects practical, functional details that 
will enable the commitments to be easily, and without uncertainty, implemented. 
7.2. Vertical integration 
Airlines, due to their network structure, have a close relationship to the airports part of their markets. 
This involves the conclusion of vertical agreements, the payment of specific charges (7.2.1.) and an 
issue of capacity (7.2.2.) which may be problematic from a competition's perspective.  
7.2.1. Airport-Airline agreements and airports' charges 
7.2.1.1. Vertical agreements 
Vertical agreements are concluded between airports and airlines to organize the manner airlines will 
use the facilities and/or services but also participate in the airport development. This paragraph will 
be brief, but such agreements must not be disregarded as they play an important role in the network 
development of airlines.   
When a passenger chooses a flight, he looks both at the airline concerned and at the airports available. 
Therefore, it is in the interests of airlines and airports to cooperate so as to attract more passengers. 
Besides, competition between airports has became a reality, and this has contributed to foster the 
relationships between airlines and airports. Where cooperation can be beneficial to consumers, it may 
also lead to anti-competitive behaviours. 
Several types of vertical relationships have been identified331: 
 Signatory airlines of airports - i.e. an airline enters a master use-and-lease agreement by which 
it commits itself to utilizing the airport for an agreed period, and in exchange the airline will 
                                                           
328  Overview on Merger and alliances in civil aviation (253), p.31-32. 
329 Doganis (2), p.111. 
330 Ryanair/Aer Lingus (310), para. 1177 and 1180. 
331 Xiaowen Fu et al., Airport- airline vertical relationships, their effects and regulatory policy implications, 
Journal of Air Transport Management 17 (2011), p. 347-353  
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have a certain influence over it and will (usually) pay lower charges than other non-signatory 
airlines. This is a guarantee for the airport; 
 Airline ownership or control of airports facilities - i.e. an airline will hold shares in an airport, 
from which will stem rights and obligations (e.g. right to profits); 
 Long-term use contracts - i.e. agreement giving airlines a right to facilities and to sublease 
facilities (provide certainty to airlines, and secure traffic for airports); 
 Airport issuance of revenue bonds to airlines - i.e. it aims at raising capital to finance  airports' 
improvements. Airports may have recourse, for instance, to special facilities revenue bonds 
where the right to use the facility will be transferred to an airline (subject to national 
legislations); 
 Revenue sharing agreements - i.e. airports have recourse to concessions with restaurants, 
shops, parking etc., and share the flowing revenues with airlines to motivate them to increase 
traffic (more passengers); 
 other agreements - e.g. exclusive or non-exclusive agreements related to price discounts, 
financial or advertising support etc. 
Such agreements can raise competitive concerns and be analysed under Article 101 TFEU, particularly 
when they are concluded at hub airports where operates a dominant airline, and where capacity is 
limited. 
Vertical agreements present certain advantages as they allow airport development but also bring 
efficiencies to the benefit of the consumers and local economy332. By sharing revenues, airlines have 
an incentive to improve their network coordination to increase the number of passengers using this 
airport. It can be translated into higher frequency of flight for example, which is something consumers 
appreciate. The possibility to own shares in an airport will also oblige the airline to be more thoughtful 
while taking decisions. 
But, on the other hand, vertical agreements can permit an airline to secure certain facilities within an 
airports and enjoys exclusive or preferential rights. Such rights may constitute a barrier to entry and 
the airline, party to the agreement, will see its market power strengthened333. Moreover airports tend 
to privilege agreements with dominant airlines334.      
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Nevertheless, the influence of such agreements will depend on a plurality of factors such as the 
airports concerned, the market structure and also the specific terms agreed upon. Therefore, vertical 
agreements must be assessed on a case-by-case basis335. 
To conclude, the issue of vertical agreements is not centre stage yet, but will probably be in the future 
as those agreements have an indisputable influence on airlines' competition. Some scholars are calling 
for more transparency and a necessary disclosure of vertical agreements336. Nonetheless, we have to 
wait to see how the Commission will approach such agreements.  
7.2.1.2. Airports' charges 
According to the Directive on airport charges337, airport charges are defined as "a levy collected for the 
benefit of the airport managing body and paid by the airport users for the use of facilities and services, 
which are exclusively provided by the airport managing body and which are related to landing, take-
off, lighting and parking of aircraft, and processing of passengers and freight". Those charges have a 
direct impact on the price paid by passengers for tickets.  
Airport charges are usually higher at hub airports than at secondary airports. This explain partly the 
reason why LCC, which aim at limiting costs, use secondary airports, which are more accessible at 
different levels. Also, airlines do not have a lot of influence over the charges imposed by airports338, 
except in a few exceptions (e.g. when they consent to be signatory airlines (see 7.2.1.1)). Airport 
charges are principally defined by Member States which decide what can be considered as such339 and 
the Directive on airport charges applies only to airports "above a minimum size"340. 
The Directive on airport charges provides that charges must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner341. Nonetheless, "the level of airport charges may be differentiated according to the quality 
and scope of such services and their costs or any other objective and transparent justification"342. 
Depending on the level of service, the level of charges will vary.  
                                                           
335 Xiaowen Fu et al. (331), p. 352. 
336 Xiaowen Fu et al. (331), p. 352. 
337 European Parliament and European Council, Directive 2009/12/EC of 11 March 2009 on airport charges, OJ 
L 70, 14.3.2009, p. 11-16. 
338 James Wiltshire, Airport Competition [2013] IATA Economics Briefing No. 11, p.25. 
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Additionally, the Directive on airport charges sets a system of compulsory consultations between 
airports and airports users regarding the charges343 and airports must be transparent in the way the 
level of charges is established344. They must provide the users with, for instance, "forecasts of the 
situation at the airport as regards the charges, traffic growth and proposed investment". The idea is 
to give users (e.g. airlines) a clear picture of how charges are calculated.  
Nonetheless, this Directive on airport charges has not been uniformly applied and greater cooperation 
between airports and airlines is necessary345. Transparency is important to avoid excessive charges, 
which would have a deterrent effect on airlines and consequently on passengers. Discriminatory prices 
on another hand would hamper competition.  
7.2.2. A complex and controversial slot allocation 
Airlines rely on infrastructure to operate flight between a web of destinations, but airports have 
limited capacity. In Europe, the problem of congested airports is an obstacle to competition and such 
airports are subjected to Regulation 95/93346. 
To operate a route, airlines must obtain slots at the origin and destination airports. A slot is defined 
as " the permission given by a coordinator (…) to use the full range of airport infrastructure necessary 
to operate an air service at a coordinated airport on a specific date and time for the purpose of landing 
or take-off as allocated by a coordinator (…)"347. To resume, a slot is a right to use and therefore access 
an airport. Nonetheless, the number of slots available is limited and the competition to obtain such 
rights is fierce.  
7.2.2.1. The current system under the amended Council Regulation 95/93 
This lead us to wonder how are slots allocated within the EU. Regulation 95/93 has been adopted in 
1993, and further amended in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2009, to set the common rules for the allocation 
of slots at community airports which are congested (referred as the coordinated airports through the 
Regulation). According to the Council, the slots allocation "should be based on neutral, transparent 
and non-discriminatory rules". 
                                                           
343 Directive on airport charges (337), Article 6. 
344 Directive on airport charges (337), Article 7. 
345 See IATA, Analysis, Airport charges: regulation with teeth, 19 February 2015, available at: 
http://airlines.iata.org/analysis/airport-charges-regulation-with-teeth  
346 European Council, Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of 
slots at Community airports, OJ L 14, 22.1.1993, p. 1, (Regulation 95/93 as amended). Consolidated version 
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Within coordinated airports knowing a "shortfall in capacity"348, slots are allocated by a slot 
coordinator for a limited period of time (i.e. the scheduling period) after which they must be returned 
to the slot pool. When an airline cannot obtain the slots it has requested, the coordinator must provide 
reasons and indicate the nearest alternative slots349. The coordinator must also act on a "neutral, non-
discriminatory and transparent way"350, and be independent.  
It is also important to note that slots can be transferred between different routes or services by an 
airline, but also within a company (parent-subsidiary), or through an acquisition of control or take-
over. They can also be exchange between airlines (one for one). The trading of slots must nonetheless 
be notified and confirmed by the coordinator prior to the implementation. No monetary 
compensations are allowed351. 
Nonetheless, one of the issue which is often considered as a barrier to entry is the existence of 
grandfather rights. Indeed, according to Article 8.2 of Regulation 95/93, an airline is not required to 
return the slots which were allocated to it for a determined scheduling period when the airline has 
operated the slots for at least 80% of the time during this period. If so, the airline can request to retain 
the slots for the next scheduling period. Besides, when an airline cannot prove the 80% requirement, 
it is still possible to justify the non-utilisation of the slots352. An airline can invoke unforeseeable and 
unavoidable circumstances outside its control for example. This extend the range of situations under 
which an airline is entitled to grandfather rights.  
The put it simply, the allocation of slots follows the "use it or lose it" rule. Similarly, if an airline does 
not use the slots within the first 20% of the scheduling period for which the slots were allocated, it 
will lose its rights, and the coordinator will return the slots to the pool353. 
These grandfather rights are problematic in the sense that they lock the access to slots. This is 
especially true within hub airports, which are the cornerstone of any FSC network. Therefore, slots at 
hub airports will only be accessible with difficulty.   
Nonetheless, some provisions aim at protecting competition and are targeting new entrants on the 
market. 50% of the slots gathered together in the pool must be allocated in priority to new entrants 
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where 50% of the requests for slots come from them - the new entrants354. Additionally, if several 
airlines operate together, only one of them is allowed to request the slots on behalf of the group355. 
Moreover, where airlines do not use the slots in the way they should (e.g. do not respect the indicated 
time for landing), the coordinator can intervene and withdraw the slots which will be reallocated 
through the pool356.  
7.2.2.2. The proposed modification (2011) 
In 2011, the Commission has proposed the "Better Airports" Package introducing some modifications 
to the slot allocation framework357. 
The proposed measures are as follows: 
 To allow secondary trading of slots, i.e. to buy and sell them358; 
 To broaden the scope of the "new entrant" definition359; 
 To increase the transparency of the allocation of slots360 (e.g. creation of software to allocate 
slots, cooperation between coordinators... etc.); 
 To associate airport management to slot allocation361; 
 To define a new category of airport: the "airport belonging to a network"362, which are not 
coordinated airports but are still important;  
 To change the threshold of the grandfather rights from 80 to 85% time use of the slots363; 
 To change the threshold for non-use slots from the first 20% to the first 15% of scheduling 
period364 after which the coordinator can withdraw the slots from an airline.  
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The Commission also proposes to enhance the role of coordinators365 and to have recourse to new 
technologies to improve the allocation of slots, and have a more transparent picture of the process366. 
Those proposed modifications need to be discussed in greater details. 
7.2.2.3. Comments as to the slot allocation system within the EU 
In my opinion, the proposal made by the Commission is promising for several reasons and seems to 
go in the right direction. The role of the different actors is more clearly defined and allows a better 
cooperation at different level. Additionally, the proposal permits a stricter control of the use of slots367 
while giving a precise guidance to airlines on the rules they are subjected to. Legal certainty is 
essential.  
This proposal would also allow a more efficient use of the slots, by modifying the two thresholds linked 
to the use of the slots. Indeed, it will be in the interest of any airline to schedule flights and maybe to 
coordinate its network, so as to have a maximum use of its slots and benefit from the grandfather 
rights.  
However, the trading of slots lacks some explanations and a clear mechanism. Trading of slot, and 
allowing compensation for it is more in line with a liberal view of the market. Nonetheless, in an 
industry such as the transport of passengers, detaining access to the infrastructure is crucial, and will 
be translated into market power. Therefore, if the EU allows for monetary compensation it must be 
supervised in a way to avoid misuse of slots. It should be noted that the risk of misuse is nonetheless 
balanced, to a certain extent, by the "use it of lose it" rule and the proposed 15% threshold. 
On the other hand, allowing more flexibility regarding the use of slots is essential. Trading a slot before 
the end of a scheduling period allows other airlines to have access to a slot which otherwise would 
not have been accessible. The issue remains to decide what kind of trading system would suit the 
objectives of the EU.  
In the proposed regulation368, the Commission had the following ideas: - The creation by the Member 
States of a transparent framework to trade slots, and -  compulsory notification of the 
transfer/exchange which must be expressly confirmed by the coordinator (he must have access to the 
details of the compensation agreed upon, if any). 
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Article 13, as proposed, may impose too much power on the shoulder of a coordinator. There is a risk 
linked to the independence of the coordinator, but also to the difficulty to assess what is a right 
compensation. The assessment of the value of a slot is a difficult one, and depends on the airport 
concerned (hub or secondary). Moreover, it should be recalled that a slot is only a right to use and 
does not include any right of ownership369. 
The second concern is related to the grandfather rights, which have been maintained in the proposal 
and can be assimilated to a "perpetual usage right" of a slot370.  
Besides, this is linked to a practice consisting in "babysitting" slots371, that is to say using a slot to the 
sole benefit of preventing a competitor from accessing the airport. Such a practice can be translated 
into using aircraft of very low capacity and using the slot to the minimum percentage of time allowed 
to maintain the grandfather rights. 
Nonetheless, the existence of grandfather rights may be justified by the need for airlines to maintain 
their network and to have a certain continuity in the services they are providing. Not all the airlines 
pursue a foreclosing strategy. Therefore, after considerations, a total prohibition of grandfather rights 
would be absurd, it appears to be a blessing in disguise.  
To remove those concerns, several tracks have been discussed and may also be convincing. Some 
more or less realistic and desirable such as to increase the capacity of airports (extend the 
infrastructures) which would have an impact on environment and would not be necessary "viable"372. 
Some alternative slot allocation processes have also been discussed. in 2002, the Nordic Competition 
Authorities gave the example of an auction system for slots373, where the airline with the higher bid 
would win the slot for a limited period of time, after which a new auction would automatically take 
place for all the slots. But as concluded within the report, even if the idea seem idyllic, in practice such 
a process would not benefit competition because dominant airlines will be in a position of strength 
and will increase the bid needlessly to foreclose some markets. The possibility to have secret biddings 
would not be enough to constitute an efficient solution374. Also, the nature of the network would not 
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render the auction system workable: too many slots to auction at once, a need for coordination 
between slots and services provided, and the risks would be borne by airlines375.  
To finish, as a reminder, the fact that a release of slots has been and is commonly accepted as a 
commitment within a Merger case highlights how important such rights are as to the structure of 
competition within the airline industry. 
7.3. Member States' interventions 
There is no definition of state aid within the treaties376, but Article 107.1 TFEU provides that, in 
principle, "any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market".   
Therefore, Article 107.1 TFEU requires four conditions as underlined: the aid must be imputable to a 
Member State; it must have a potential effect on competition and trade; and, it must be selective and 
give an economic advantage to the recipient.   
Regarding the existence of an advantage conferred to the recipient of the aid377, the ECJ has commonly 
(but not exclusively) recourse to the private investor test378 to assess whether a private entity would 
have agreed upon the same terms as the public entity did.   
Nonetheless, where the advantage granted, by the public entity to an undertaking, consists on a 
compensation which has been given in exchange to the completion of a service of general economic 
interest ("SGEI"), such advantage will not be considered as state aid under certain conditions. 
Following the Altmark case379, four cumulative conditions must be fulfilled: i. there is a clearly defined 
public service obligation380; ii. the compensation mechanism is established "in advance in an objective 
and transparent manner"381; iii. the compensation "cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or 
                                                           
375 Report from the Nordic Competition Authorities (49), p.106-107. 
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378 Craig and de Burca (103), p. 1090. 
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part of the costs"382; and, iv. in absence of a public procurement procedure, the compensation must 
be calculated in function of the costs incurred by a typical undertaking383.  
Additionally, several block exemptions384 must be taken into consideration when assessing a measure 
and if the aid under scrutiny fulfils the conditions provided in a block exemption it will be compatible 
with the internal market, and avoid the notification requirement.   
Aside from these exceptions, "any plan to grant or alter aid" must be notified "in sufficient time" to 
the Commission under Article 108.3 TFEU385. The Commission has for mission to assess whether the 
measure is a state aid under Article 107.1 TFEU and if it is, whether it can be compatible with Articles 
107.2 and 107.3 TFEU. When a measure implemented without the authorization of the Commission 
(i.e. an unlawful aid) is found incompatible with the internal market, the Commission may order the 
suspension of the aid or/and its recovery386.  
In the specific case of the airline industry, different kinds of state aids can be observed (7.3.1.). 
Additionally, public service obligations which may be the object of compensation have been regulated 
under Regulation 1008/2008387 (7.3.2.). 
7.3.1. State aid in the airline industry 
State aid in the airlines industry, but also in general, may be problematic because it can distort 
competition and affect trade. State aid rules also crystallise the conflict which may exist between 
different objectives pursued the EU. For instance, the EU aims at protecting competition in the internal 
market but also to promote regional and social developments. Certain measures granted to airlines 
create a clash between these objectives388. It is for the Commission to balance all the interests at stake.   
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384 e.g. European Commission, Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid 
compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance) 
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In 2014, the new guidelines on state aid to airports and airlines389 saw the day and replaced the 1994 
and 2005 Aviation guidelines. The new guidelines develop a market-oriented approach390 and promote 
the concept of sound business391, i.e. the airline industry must be more efficiently developed.  
The 2014 Guidelines also introduce a new test to assess the advantage given to the recipient of an aid: 
the Market Economic Operator test, which "replaces" the private investor test392. This test has been 
described as an umbrella393 concept which covers the former tests developed by the Union Courts 
(private investor test, private creditor test and private vendor test)394. The Market Economic Operator 
test follows the same methodology and allows "to assess whether a range of economic transactions 
carried out by public authorities, public bodies or public undertakings take place under normal market 
conditions and, therefore, whether they involve the granting of an advantage (which would not have 
occurred in normal market conditions) to the undertakings concerned"395. The assessment should 
consider the market conditions at the time the measure was decided396. The appeal of such a test 
resides in the possibility to apply it in all circumstances, without having to use different test titles in 
function of the type of aid granted. It also brings coherency and clarity.   
State aids are in principle incompatible with the internal market (107.1 TFEU) but there are some 
exceptions that can be relevant in the airline industry.  
7.3.1.1. start-up aid 
7.3.1.1.1. The actual framework 
Article 107.3.c TFEU provides that "aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or 
of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent 
contrary to the common interest" may be compatible with the internal market.  
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Similarly, start-up aids are "aid granted to airlines for launching a new route with the aim of increasing 
the connectivity of a region"397 and they may be compatible with the internal market under Article 
107.3.c TFEU where they fulfil the following requirements398:  
 The aid must pursue an objective of common interest: increase citizens' mobility or 
connectivity of the regions, facilitate regional development of remote regions399. 
 There is a need for State intervention400; 
 The aid must be appropriate to the objective: the airline will have to provide an ex-ante 
business plan showing prospect of profitability following the three years of state aid, or a 
commitment to operate the route for a period equivalent to the duration of the collection of 
the state aid401; 
 The aid must be an incentive to do something that otherwise would not have been realized: 
the new route would not open without the aid402; 
 The aid must be proportionate to the objective: the start-up aid is limited to three years, and 
cannot cover more than 50% of the airport charges on the new route403; 
 The negative effect must be balanced: The start-up aid plan must be made public 
appropriately and can only concern a limited number of routes where no substitutable 
transports (e.g. rail) are available404; 
 Transparency of the aid. 
Also, following Paragraph 153, airlines cannot combine several aids granted for the operation of a 
specific route. 
 7.3.1.1.2.The improvements brought by the 2014 Guidelines 
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Under the previous guidelines, the 2005 Guidelines, a list of criteria was also set to determine when a 
start-up aid could be compatible with EU law. Twelves conditions were listed, and some of them have 
been modified by the 2014 Guidelines.  
In the 2005 Guidelines, for instance, Paragraph 79.d provided for at degressive system of aid, based 
on the number of passengers transported405. The system was complex, and according to Paragraph 
79.f. the aid could last up to 3 or 5 years depending on the route and airports concerned. The aid could 
not exceed up to 50%, 40% or 30% of the costs borne depending on the route and the period of 
reference considered (full period of aid or only on a year-basis). The 2005 Guidelines also required the 
route to be viable on a long-term ("ultimately prove profitable")406. Additionally, Paragraph 79.d 
provided that "the aid should be stopped once the objectives in terms of passengers have been reached 
or when the line breaks even, even if this is achieved before the end of the period initially foreseen".   
Such system had been criticised. One of the issues was that an aid granted could become incompatible 
with the internal market thereafter, if the route stopped to prove to be profitable407. Also, when an 
airline had reached the objectives of the aid, it automatically lost the benefits of the aid. Therefore, 
airlines had no interest in being completely efficient408. 
More problematically, the 2005 Guidelines did not clearly define the types of efficiencies airlines could 
use under Article 107.3.c TFEU to justify the recourse to start-up aid409. Indeed, Paragraph 79.b and c 
of the 2005 Guidelines only referred to" the opening of routes (…) which will lead to an increase in the 
net volume of passengers" and to a case-by-case assessment for routes departing from outermost 
regions' airports.  
To finish, and contrary to the actual system, the 2005 Guidelines allowed for additional start-up costs 
including marketing and advertising costs for the new route410, and set a system of penalties towards 
airlines failing to respect their commitments411.  
To conclude, it appears that the 2014 Guidelines set a more clear and efficient system to grant start-
up aid to airlines. Certainty is guaranteed as airlines know exactly how much and for how long they 
will be granted the aid and can focus on the development of the new route. Additionally, they have a 
                                                           
405 The 2005 Guidelines (392), para. 79.g. 
406 The 2005 Guidelines (392), para. 79.d. 
407 Schmauch (16), p.296. 
408 Schmauch (16), p. 297. 
409 Schmauch (16), p. 295. 
410 The 2005 Guidelines (392), para. 79.e. 
411 The 2005 Guidelines (392), para. 79.l. 
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clear understanding of the purpose and justifications of start-up aids even though Guidelines are not 
binding for the Courts.  
In the same time, airlines are still subjected to a strict procedure and a start-up aid must follow the 
transparency, proportionality and necessity requirements. Additionally, the aid is only granted where 
there is no substitutable transport and where the airlines has made commitments to operate the route 
or has shown some prospect of profitability.  
The final comment on the 2005 Guidelines is related to point (17) where the Commission highlighted 
the possibility of anti-competitive behaviours of LCC during aid negotiations412. As previously stated, 
it is usually LCC that focus on secondary airports as their point-to-point system is more adapted to the 
situation. They are more likely interested in building new routes with small airports. From the 
Commission's perspective the development of LCC was also presenting a risk to competition. 
Nonetheless, the position of the Commission through the 2014 Guidelines has become more 
favourable to LCC, and the Commission recalls "the positive contribution of the low-cost carriers" 
business model to the development of some regional airports413". It adopts a neutral approach to the 
different business models of airlines while condemning any distortion to competition414.   
7.3.1.2.Other aids 
7.3.1.2.1. Aid of a social character under Article 107.2.a TFEU 
The 2014 Guidelines also set a list of conditions following which a measure shall be compatible with 
the internal market where it has a social character within the meaning of Article 107.2.a TFEU. 
To be considered as such, the aid must: be to the benefit of the final consumer (i.e. the passenger); 
have a social character (it involves either passengers with children/disabilities/low income, students 
and elderly; or the entire population of outermost regions, islands and sparsely populated areas); the 
scheme must be applied without discriminating between airlines415. 
7.3.1.2.2. Regional aids granted under Article 107.3.a TFEU 
A regional aid is defined through Article 107.3.a TFEU as an "aid to promote the economic development 
of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, 
and of the regions referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation".  
                                                           
412 Schmauch (16), p. 294. 
413 The 2014 Guidelines (389), point (19). 
414 The 2014 Guidelines (389), point (19). 
415 The 2014 Guidelines (389), para. 156, and Article 107.2.a TFEU. 
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Under the 2005 Guidelines, it was possible to assess start-up aids under both 107.3.a and c416, but 
there is no reference to Article 107.3.a TFEU in the 2014 Guidelines. Nonetheless, it does not mean 
that airlines cannot receive aid under this provision.  
7.3.1.2.3. Capital injections, loans and guarantees 
Capital injections, loans and guarantees where widely included within the 1994 Guidelines417 (which 
were applicable in parallel to the 2005 Guidelines) but only a few reference appeared in the 2015 
Guidelines. Under the 1994 Guidelines, capital injections, loans and guarantees from Member States 
could constitute state aids and be incompatible with the treaties. This remains the same under the 
2015 Guidelines but the Commission's approach differs. Indeed, instead of writing a specific paragraph 
for each practice, the Commission only gives a broad definition of state aid and state resources, and 
applies the Market Economic Operator test to assess whether the public body behaves as a private 
body. Moreover guarantees have been the object of a specific Notice418 in 2008 to clarify the 
application of the state aid rules, and a separate communication (applicable to the airline industry) 
from the Commission focuses on rescuing and restructuring aid419. 
To finish, it should be noted that a financial relationships between an airport and an airline may be 
considered as a state aid in certain circumstances420. A similar position was adopted by the 2005 
Guidelines421. Therefore vertical agreements between airlines and airports have also to be scrutinized 
under Article 107 TFEU.  
7.3.2. Public service obligation (PSO)   
Article 93 TFEU, contained on Title VI on Transport, provided that "aids shall be compatible with the 
treaties if they meet the needs of coordination of transport or if they represent reimbursement for the 
discharge of certain obligations inherent in the concept of a public service". Nevertheless, air transport 
is excluded from the provisions of Title VI422. This is Regulation 1008/2008 that regulates the issue of 
public service obligations in the airline industry, in combination with the SGEI package.   
                                                           
416 The 2005 Guidelines (392),points (28) and (29). 
417 Community guidelines on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA 
Agreement to State aids in the aviation sector, OJ C 350, 10.12.1994 
418 European Commission, Communication - Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to 
State aid in the form of guarantees, OJ C 155, 20.06.2008, p.10-22. 
419 European Commission, Communication — Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring non-
financial undertakings in difficulty, OJ C 249, 31.7.2014, p. 1-28. 
420 The 2014 Guidelines (389), para. 53. 
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Regarding PSO, to summarise, a Member State can impose a PSO on a route under Article 16 of 
Regulation 1008/2008. The PSO can be related to the continuity, regularity, pricing or capacity of the 
service operate on the route, and such standards must be "set in a transparent and non-discriminatory 
way". The routes that may be subjected to a PSO are routes between any Community airports and 
airports serving peripheral or development regions, or tiny routes which are essential for the 
economic and social development of a specific region. Both adequacy and necessity of a PSO have to 
be assessed, and the proportionality of the measure, the existence of transport substitution but also 
the price and conditions of the service provided and the competition climate on the route are taken 
into account.  
Members States are expected to inform the concerned Member States, airports and airlines of their 
intention of setting a PSO, following that, the PSO will be published in the Official Journal of the EU or 
of the Member State concerned. After the publication, airlines are free to operate on the route under 
the PSO conditions423. When no airline does so or plan to do so, the Member State can restrict the 
access to the route to a single airline for four years nay five years through a public tender424. 
Compensation may only be granted in consideration for the PSO for which an airline went through a 
public tender, but it "may not exceed the amount required to cover the net costs incurred in 
discharging each public service obligation, taking account of revenue relating thereto kept by the air 
carrier and a reasonable profit"425. This compensation may amount to state aid, but the Commission 
can decide to investigate the PSO.  
To conclude on state aid and service of general economic interest, the air transport sector is subjected 
to a plurality of rules and the system remains complex, even though it has been simplified in the last 
years.   
                                                           
423 Regulation 1008/2008 (387), Article 16.8. 
424 Regulation 1008/2008 (387), Articles 16.9, 16.10 and 17. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Airlines competition is a complex matter requiring a deep analysis of the different models and 
strategies of the undertakings concerned, but also of the consumers' behaviour. Therefore, 
competitive assessments of airlines activities is difficult.  
Everything starts with a market definition, and in the airline industry the current method is based on 
the origin and destination city-pair. This approach draws distinctions between the type of passengers, 
direct and indirect flight, etc... but this approach should be improved.  Indeed, in my view, isolating a 
specific route from the network of an airline can lead to some misconception as to an airline real 
position on the market. The network effects, which are considered as to alliances (Part 7.1.), should 
be given a bigger place in the assessment. In the same time, it has been argued, by the Commission 
among other, that the network approach was not interesting for consumers, who do not focus on the 
whole picture but on specific routes which are relevant for them; or the main purpose of competition 
law is to protect consumers and not competitors. Nonetheless, the origin and destination city-pair 
approach does not always represent the reality and can be problematic. Currently, one way to mitigate 
the situation could be to use the concept of neighbouring markets426 when one undertaking is 
dominant in one market and uses it to influence another market. A more dynamic approach towards 
the market definition is essential.  
To continue, several points described in the present thesis may call for improvements. If we consider 
pricing practices, for instance, there is a fine line between competitive and anti-competitive prices. 
Therefore, the Commission and the Courts should operate a meticulous assessment on a case-by-case 
basis. Cost-based tests, such as in the Post Danmark case, are problematic because it can be difficult 
to identify fixed and variable costs (they can also depend on the period under consideration and the 
industry concerned). On the other hand, excessive low prices can be disastrous both for competitors 
and for consumers in a long term. In parallel, the cost-reduction race, which has started with the 
appearance of LCC, can lead to a degradation of the workers' working conditions and may give rise to 
labour issues. This is a social consideration which must be discussed in the light of the EU objectives. 
Regarding predatory prices in the airline industry, we cannot predict the position of the EU yet, but 
the solution adopted by the German Competition Authority appears to be a bit lacking.  
In the context of alliances, the EU has accepted specific remedies from airlines, inter alia, the divesture 
of slots and the opening of frequent flyer programmes. Alliances allow for better deals and more 
                                                           
426 See C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak International SA v Commission of the European Communities, 14 November 1996, 
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efficient services (more destinations, synchronisation of services - luggage, tickets etc.) to the benefit 
of passengers, but they can also distort and prevent competition. The Commission tries to prevent 
that by limiting the latent exclusivity of certain alliances. Nonetheless, the Commission has a tendency 
to rely mainly on the two remedies cited above, and it should maybe consider a wider range of 
remedies (e.g. prohibiting code-sharing on route where both airlines operate).   
Nonetheless, slots remain at the heart of the debate. The 2011 Regulation proposal may solve one 
side of the problem by suggesting stricter requirements to maintain grandfather rights. Indeed, 
obtaining slots at certain airports will still be difficult. Nonetheless, an industry without a minimum 
certainty cannot be viable. To invest and to put strategies into effect, airlines cannot navigate through 
troubled waters. The 2011 Regulation proposal sets a balance between the need for flexibility and the 
need for stability.  
Regarding state aid, the transport sector is not harmonized and different sources of rules are 
applicable to airlines. The situation has been improved but still lack coherency between the different 
modes of transport. Besides, the recourse to state aids is not unusual in the industry even though it 
has been limited to precise circumstances and conditions. Airlines should stay vigilant when they enter 
into contractual relationships with airports as they may received indirect state aids. Moreover, the 
Commission and the competition authorities should pay more attention to vertical agreements. From 
the above, it is more than apparent that competition in the airline industry is influenced by a 
multiplicity of variables. 
To conclude, more generally, I believe that the airline industry is mature and highly competitive 
nowadays. The tools implemented and used by the EU promote efficiently competition even though 
It is impossible to prevent every anti-competitive behaviours. Moreover, we must wait a few years to 
see the effects of the latest legislations and the entry into effect of new rules which are currently 
under discussion. Also, dominant airlines are not reigning unconditionally on the market, and the 
development of LCC has created a new dynamic. Airlines are not sheltered from a plurality of risks 
inherent to their activities. Terrorism, fuel prices and geopolitics in general have a huge impact on 
them. The challenge, in the future, will probably be for airlines to focus on labour conditions and 
security.   
   
 
  
71 
 
 
 
 
9. ANNEXES 
 
9.1. The nine freedoms of the air explained 
 
Source: Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport (Doc 9626, Part 4, p.106) 
   
 
  
72 
 
 
 
 
9.2. The hub-and-spoke and point-to-point systems 
 
 
 
Source: Alessandro Cento, The Airline Industry: Challenges in the 21st Century (Contributions to 
Economics) (Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2009), p.32. 
 
9.3. Alliances within the airline industry 
 
 
Source: Alessandro Cento, The Airline Industry: Challenges in the 21st Century (Contributions to 
Economics) (Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2009), p. 39. 
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Source: Rigas Doganis, The Airline Business (2nd Edition, Routledge, 2006), p. 89. 
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